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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ESSAYS ON MIGRATION: NEXUS WITH POLICY, TRADE, AND
DEVELOPMENT
by
Michael Good
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Cem Karayalcin, Major Professor
This dissertation analyzes the intersection of migration with public policy,
international trade, and economic development. The first essay investigates the impact on
internal migration for 52 different demographic groups of the recent influx of state omnibus
immigration laws targeting undocumented immigrants in the United States. Through a
difference-in-differences estimation, I find empirical evidence that while the demographic
groups pinpointed as having higher percentages of undocumented immigrants certainly
experience population and employment 'outflows' from states implementing these
immigration laws, there is a lack of associated 'inflows' for those demographic groups
identified by economic theory as being probable substitutes for undocumented immigrants.
Several segments designated as probable substitutes actually experience an adverse effect
on population and employment.
The second essay examines the effect that migrants have on international trade
between states of current residence and states of origin. My analysis provides the first
results as to the migration-trade nexus at the state level for both places of destination and
origin, relying on a unique data set allowing the mapping of Mexican-born migrants' U.S.

vi

states of residence to Mexican states of origin. In addition to an augmented gravity model,
I employ generalized propensity scores in examining the potential of nonlinearities in the
migration-trade relationship, estimating statistically significant elasticities of exports to
both in-state and neighboring-state migration.
The third essay analyzes the potentially enormous wage gains that may motivate
international migration, an activity which is limited to some extent by governments across
the entire world. Freer human mobility and the effects of migration on the migrants
themselves have not garnered nearly as much attention as numerous other topics related to
the economics of migration. I present novel data collected through household interviews in
communities both in Mexico and the United States, comparing the absolute and relative
wage gains for interviewees with data from existing Mexican surveys. Migrants indeed
stand to collect large net gains; average incomes increase more than fivefold immediately,
moving from the lower deciles of origin wage distributions to the top deciles. These results
surpass those of some of the most successful current programs of economic development.
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CHAPTER I
DO IMMIGRANT OUTFLOWS LEAD TO NATIVE INFLOWS?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MIGRATORY RESPONSES TO U.S.
STATE IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION
Introduction
The recent influx of state immigration legislation in the United States provides an
ideal quasi-experimental setting appropriate for examining the connection between
immigration and internal migration. Since 2006, eleven different states have enacted
fourteen omnibus immigration laws, implementing broad restrictions in relation to issues
affecting immigrants such as work authorization, public program benefits, education,
human trafficking and the transport and harbor of unauthorized immigrants, identification
and driver's license policies, and document-carrying policies. A simple analysis of the
incentives created by these wide-reaching omnibus laws leads to an expectation of outflows
of the undocumented immigrant population from those states implementing immigration
laws, as well as possible inflows among other demographics not specifically targeted by
the new laws. Anecdotal evidence certainly provides backing to this expectation of
immigrant outflows, as there are numerous reports of large out-migrations, especially of
the undocumented population, in states which have recently put omnibus immigration laws
into practice.1 However, much of the same anecdotal evidence also points to a lack of
inflows of other demographic groups into the immigrant-vacated jobs, leading to a shortage
of workers in certain areas where the outflows have been particularly strong. The anecdotal
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See Robertson (2011) for one of many articles documenting this migratory response.
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evidence begs the empirical analysis of a simple yet important question, which is the focus
of the present study: Do immigrant outflows lead to native inflows?
The approach to attack this question utilizes a straightforward, two-step process.
First, I use microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to analyze in great detail
the pre- and post-implementation numbers relating to both population and employment of
demographic groups targeted by the state immigration laws. By use of a difference-indifferences estimation that exploits the natural experiment setting and employs a treatment
and control group (the treatment being the implementation of the state immigration law), I
am able to verify if there truly are immigrant outflows in response to the change in state
policy. Second, using the same microdata along with the treatment and control process, I
analyze the pre- and post-implementation numbers of the demographic groups not targeted
by the state immigration laws, permitting the identification of any native (or documented
immigrant) population or worker inflows (outflows) in those states experiencing targeted
immigrant outflows.
The importance of the study's findings is twofold. First, the documentation of the
actual migratory response to the surge of state immigration laws is important in its own
right. While much anecdotal evidence has been accumulated, detailed empirical analyses
are lacking, possibly partly due to the relative newness of this trend in immigration
legislation and the difficulty inherent in identifying the undocumented population. Second,
there is an established literature examining the relationship between immigration and
internal migration responses. However, despite numerous studies, this debate laden with
key policy implications still has no clear victor. The present study contributes to the
ongoing debate by providing additional rigorous empirical evidence as to the relationship

2

between immigration and internal migration responses. My analysis indicates that while
the demographic groups pinpointed as having higher percentages of undocumented
individuals indeed experience population and employment outflows from states
implementing these immigration laws, there is a lack of associated inflows for those
demographic groups identified by economic theory as being probable substitutes for
undocumented immigrants. Although minimal substitution is present, several segments of
the population designated as probable substitutes actually experience an adverse effect on
population and employment.
To my knowledge, this is the first research exploiting the implementation of state
omnibus immigration laws to explicitly examine the question posited above: Do immigrant
outflows lead to native inflows? Card and Dinardo (2000) asks the question 'Do immigrant
inflows lead to native outflows?' in the very title of the article - the experiment provided
by the implementation of the current state immigration legislation now allows for a natural
examination of the opposite side of their question, arguably just as important. The chapter
is most related to Raphael and Ronconi (2009), which finds a significant out-migration of
Hispanic immigrants from states passing immigration legislation. However, while similar
in approach, their article examines only immigration laws specifically targeting
employment and the sample is limited to pre-2009 implementation of laws, excluding a
majority of this paper's richer sample.
After providing a brief background of recent U.S. state immigration law and a
review of the relevant economic theory, I give specifics as to the data and my empirical
strategy. I discuss the results of the difference-in-differences estimations for the various

3

demographic groups, finally checking for sensitivity and robustness before a brief
conclusion.
State Immigration Law
A brief overview
Evident from the statistics provided by the National Conference of State
Legislatures, the recent growth in the number of state immigration laws enacted in the
United States is astounding. Table 1.1 outlines the number of immigration laws by category
passed by state legislatures during the period of 2005 to 2011, the number vetoed by
governors, and the number ultimately adopted by states.2 A majority of the laws target a
specific issue in relation to undocumented immigrants, such as work authorization, public
program benefits, or identification and licenses. While these focused laws certainly lower
the incentive for an undocumented immigrant to reside in the respective state (some much
more than others), a handful of states have implemented omnibus laws that address
multiple issues at the same time. These broad-reaching laws theoretically have the largest
effect on any outflows of immigrants, due to their nature of affecting not only employment
opportunities, but also possibly limiting access to food, health, and education benefits, and
in general creating an environment in which there is a constant threat of document
verification and subsequent deportation. While the number of states enacting these multiissue laws has been limited, 2011 brought a particular surge - five states enacted omnibus
legislation, while some eight states had similar legislation pending by year's end. The

2

All statistics in this section are obtained from the National Conference of State Legislatures website,
www.ncsl.org. All categories listed at www.ncsl.org are included in Table 1.1 with the exception of
'resolutions,' due to the fact that these laws tend to have no relation to a detrimental effect on immigrants.
Budget laws are included in the 'Miscellaneous' category.

4

Appendix lists the fourteen states having already passed omnibus laws, accompanied by a
summary of the issues addressed in each law.
Theoretical impact
Understanding the theoretical effect of the implementation of state omnibus
immigration laws on the population and employment numbers of undocumented
immigrants involves a simple cost and benefit analysis. Assuming that each individual has
some benefit and some cost corresponding to living (working) in a particular geographic
location, state immigration laws result in an increased cost burdening each undocumented
individual.3 The cost could take various forms: an evasion cost, a discrimination cost, or a
psychological cost, just to name a few. If all individuals only accept positive payoffs, a
first indicator of an individual's (re)location decision is if the associated benefit is still
higher than the now greater cost. However, even if the total payoff remains positive, the
relevant indicator is the comparison of that total payoff to all other available payoffs, those
potentially realized by migration to another US state or migration to another country.
Clearly, if other possible payoffs do not differ greatly from the payoff of the immigrant's
state of residence before the implementation of omnibus immigration law, the extra cost
imposed by implementation could change an individual's payoff-maximizing location,
ultimately causing out-migration. However, if a particular location gives a preimplementation payoff much higher than all other options, a payoff-maximizing

3

Although a substantial literature examines individuals' decisions to migrate, many times detailing the
specific associated costs and benefits at great length, I choose to lump these into one generalized cost and
benefit for each individual for reasons of simplifying the demonstration of the theoretical impact of
immigration law.
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undocumented individual could rationally choose to stay in a state even after
implementation of immigration law.
An additional potential impact of immigration law is the effect implementation may
have on employers, outlined in Raphael and Ronconi (2009). Most omnibus laws include
some measure related to employment status verification, punishing employers caught
hiring undocumented workers. If this is the case, employers now bear a higher cost related
to hiring this segment of the population, translating into a lower payoff for undocumented
individuals as the probability of obtaining the benefit associated with employment
decreases.
Whether or not this hypothesized outflow of immigrants in turn incentivizes a
response from the native or documented immigrant population is a more complicated
question, due to the fact that the answer depends on the substitutability of these groups, a
topic that numerous studies continue to examine. As much of the undocumented population
is relatively low-skilled, these studies generally focus on the production substitutability of
low-skilled natives (or low-skilled, foreign-born citizens) for immigrants. Ottoviano and
Peri (2012) estimates that natives and immigrants of similar skill in the U.S. are imperfect
substitutes, while Borjas et al. (2008) estimates an infinite substitution, pointing to the
perfect substitutability of these demographic groups. After finding imperfect substitution
among similarly-skilled natives and immigrants, Card (2009) points out that those most
affected in terms of employment by the arrival of immigrants are those immigrants who
had previously established residence in the area under examination.
As the issue of substitutability continues to be debated, various additional studies
empirically analyze the related topic of whether immigrant inflows are associated with
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native outflows (the partner research question to the present study), often focusing on how
these flows may in turn affect workers' wages. Studies such as Filer (1992), Frey (1995),
Borjas et al. (1997), and Borjas (2006) contend that immigration inflows do lead to native
outflows; on the other hand, others including Wright et al. (1997), Card (2001), Kritz and
Gurak (2001), and Peri and Sparber (2008) argue that native outflows, if present, do not
stem from immigration inflows.
One of the central economic arguments stated by immigration law supporters, that
of 'immigrants take natives' jobs,' follows directly from the findings of the former group of
studies. In the current context of state immigration legislation, this reasoning implies that
if immigrants in fact emigrate to another state (or country), natives will fill those jobs that
were previously 'taken.' In the words of omnibus immigration law author Kris Kobach, this
implication taken literally translates into 'if you want to create a job for a US citizen
tomorrow, deport an illegal alien today.'4 Logically, the possible inflow of natives could
manifest itself in one of two fashions: 1) population and worker inflows of natives moving
from other states looking to replace the immigrant-vacated positions, or 2) worker inflows
from the native population already present in the respective state (previously either
unemployed or not in the labor force). The former possibility alters both population and
employment numbers; the latter possibility does not appear as a change in the native
population, but clearly surfaces as a change in the employment numbers. Following this
line of thinking, this expected native inflow should be especially notable in times of high

4

I first encountered this commentary from the Kansas Secretary of State, who doubled as immigration
advisor to U.S. presidential candidate Mitt Romney, as reported by Univision's Noticiero Edición Nocturna
(Nightly News Edition). Video of Kobach's related comments, as part of the Conservative Political Action
Conference (CPAC), is readily accessible on the Internet.
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unemployment, such as those experienced during much of the period in focus.5
Furthermore, since the geographical unit under examination is at the state level, the
empirical setup is particularly conducive to observing this native inflow. Borjas (2006)
points out that larger outflow (inflow) effects as a native response to immigration are found
'the easier that natives find it to “vote with their feet”.' If inflows are indeed stemming
mostly from within-state individuals previously not employed, this study obtains the largest
possible inflow observable since there is absolutely zero cost to moving. In fact, a native
inflow into employment does not even necessarily require 'voting with their feet.'
Considering these conditions stacking the deck in favor of observing native inflows, if
these inflows do not accompany immigrant outflows, the economic argument supporting
stricter immigration policy quickly loses any traction it may have had.
Data and Empirical Strategy
In detailing the different possible migratory manifestations, I examine the data from
the CPS both in terms of population and employment for all individuals ages 20 to 60.
Monthly microdata cover six years, allowing for analysis of the period August 2005 to
September 2011. I classify the population and employment data according to 52
demographic groups, forming an essential part of my empirical strategy. Demographic
indicators include citizenship/nativity, race/ethnicity, and education. Citizenship/nativity
divides the population into four groups: U.S. citizen/born in U.S., U.S. naturalized
citizen/foreign-born, noncitizen/foreign-born, and noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S.

5

Unemployment rates calculated from the CPS reflect an average of nearly 7% unemployment in states at
respective times of omnibus law implementation. While high compared temporally to adjacent periods
within states, the average is below the national unemployment rate average of 7.7% for the same monthyear combinations of implementation.
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after 1982. While the first three groups are clearly mutually exclusive, noncitizen/foreignborn and noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982 are not, intentionally allowing
for what I call 'demographic narrowing.' Demographic narrowing is my main strategy for
pinpointing and comparing the demographic groups most likely (not) affected by the
implementation of immigration law; it allows for narrowing the focus from a larger group,
such as noncitizen/foreign-born, to a smaller portion of the larger group, such as those
foreign-born noncitizens arriving to the U.S. after 1982. The necessity arises because the
CPS and other available data sources do not specify legal or illegal status of the noncitizen
population. However, by use of undocumented population estimates and a well-constructed
demographic narrowing process, I can confidently identify those groups that are
theoretically most affected.6 As an example, the specification of noncitizen/foreignborn/arrived to U.S. after 1982 allows for pinpointing the narrowest group most likely
targeted by the laws in terms of citizenship/nativity status. The group should have more
members of illegal status than the noncitizen/foreign-born because of the Immigration Act
of 1986, which legalized the residency of any immigrant present in the U.S. prior to 1982.
While the obvious presence of many legal residents in the 'noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived
to U.S. after 1982' category leaves this specification far from a perfect identification of the
undocumented population, the narrowing achieves a second-best approximation of the
targeted population.7
6

Passel and Cohn (2009) outlines these estimates, signaling for example, that of the 11.9 million
undocumented immigrants in the U.S., 76% are Hispanic.
7

Achieving the 'best approximation,' i.e. exact identification of the undocumented population, through
surveys such as the CPS may actually not be ideal for this paper's purposes. If survey participants were
explicitly asked about legal residency status, many undocumented residents would likely not willfully
respond to the survey, creating an even stronger tendency toward non-response from this demographic than
that which already exists.
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Race/ethnicity separates individuals into four groups as well: white/non-Hispanic,
black/non-Hispanic, Asian/non-Hispanic, and Hispanic. The specific, perhaps unorthodox
classification marks an intentional effort to avoid potential ambiguity, given the manner in
which the CPS race and ethnicity questions are formulated. The survey classifies race by
the options of 'white only,' 'black only,' 'American Indian only,' 'Asian only,' 'Hawaiian
only,' or any combinations of the above; Hispanic or non-Hispanic status is determined in
a separate question. The problem arises from the fact that these two classifications exhibit
overlap; nearly all individuals who identify themselves as Hispanic also identify race as
white or black, with a lower number identifying the other race categories. If this overlap
were not accounted for and individuals were in turn classified simply as white, black, or
Hispanic, a majority of Hispanics would be double-counted, causing an enormous problem
of bias. Education simply classifies people as low-skilled or high-skilled, completion of
high school marking the upper limit of the low-skilled category.8
For each of the 52 demographic groups, I specify an econometric model of the
following form:

The fixed effects/difference-in-differences specification employs dummy variables
for all states and month-year combinations, represented by
placeholder

and

, respectively. The

is for the variable of interest, either population or employment of state in

month-year for each demographic group.

is a dummy variable taking a value of

one for all if state receives treatment (omnibus immigration law implementation) at any

8
This education dividing line is selected based on results from Card (2009) finding that 'high school
equivalent' and 'college equivalent' workers are imperfect substitutes.
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point in the 2005 to 2011 period.
state , period
state

is a dummy variable taking a value of one if for

is post-treatment. In turn,

takes a value of one only when

actually receives treatment in month-year .

unobservable systematic differences across states, while

controls for any observable or
controls for any differences

over time that may affect all states' outcomes, such as changes to federal immigration law.9
is the coefficient of interest, the difference-in-differences estimate representing the
change in the lefthand-side variable associated with omnibus immigration law
implementation.10 I examine population and employment of the demographic groups in
terms of both proportions and levels. First, by expressing population (employment) as
logarithms, I use the specified equation to estimate the percentage change in the variable
of interest associated with state immigration law implementation. Second, I use the
logarithm of the demographic group to state total ratio for each variable of interest to
estimate percentage changes in the composition of population (employment) associated
with the implementation of state immigration law.11

9

A potential concern may be that part of the period under examination is spanned by an economic crisis in
the U.S.. However, any effects from the economic crisis are controlled for by the inclusion of the monthyear combination time fixed effects; furthermore, if individual states suffered more or less than other states
due to the financial crisis, this is controlled for by the individual state fixed effects.
10

While the difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) method is an attractive alternative to differencein-differences (DD), DDD does not improve on DD in this study's case. The inclusion in DDD of the
within-state control group is problematic due to the fact that I expect some effect on the population and
employment of those 'non-immigrant' demographic groups in states receiving treatment. If these groups
were to form a within-state control group as part of the DDD estimator, the measured effect of the state
immigration legislation would obtain an upward bias. By employing DD, I avoid this potential bias and
therefore am able to separate out the effects on the various demographic groups and their respective
responses to implementation of the immigration laws.

11
For each ratio, the population (employment) of the specific demographic group being examined serves as
the numerator, while the state total serves as the denominator.
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For each set of regressions, I define two different control groups: 1) neighboring
states of each respective state receiving treatment and 2) all U.S. states. While use of the
first control group permits a potential bias due to the possibility of outflows (inflows)
affecting mainly neighboring states, this possibility seems not to have manifested itself.
The data show only slight changes in neighboring states' population and employment after
immigration legislation. Furthermore, this is to be expected - the immigrant outflows may
be large especially in terms of percentages, however the associated levels result in only
small changes for receiving states when spread out over many states of relocation.
Nonetheless, the inclusion of the second control group, all U.S. states, allows for a simple
comparison, theoretically minimizing any bias that may exist through use of neighboring
states in the regional control group. I exclude states from control group consideration if
treatment is received during or prior to the respective legislation implementation period
under examination. For the baseline regressions, six months on either side of the
legislation's implementation date form the legislation implementation period and enter as
observations into the regressions, allowing for a certain amount of flexibility in capturing
any population and employment changes that result from omnibus legislation but may not
be captured by only examining the months immediately before and after implementation.
I confirm the presence of a common trend with the results of t-tests reported in
Tables 1.2 and 1.3. For each of the six months in the period prior to implementation, a ttest is performed comparing the portions of population from the treatment group with those
of the control group made up by each of four demographic groups of central importance:
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived

to

U.S.

after

1982/Hispanic/low-skilled,

native/Hispanic/low-skilled, native/white/non-Hispanic/low-skilled, and native/black/
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non-Hispanic/low-skilled.12 While small differences in means are certainly present, these
differences are minimal and not statistically significant at the 5% level, evidenced by all tstatistics below an absolute value of 0.70 in Table 1.2 for the regional control group. Use
of the alternative national control group results in no statistically significant differences at
the 5% level, and all t-statistics are below an absolute value of 0.82. Given the evident
presence of the common trend, I thereby verify the central identification assumption and
validate the difference-in-differences estimates.
The nature of the state omnibus immigration legislation process presents an
additional problem in relation to defining the point of separation for pre- and posttreatment, due to the varying lapse of time between law enactment and implementation as
well as various challenges to the legality of the omnibus laws (outlined in the Appendix).
I choose the established implementation date (labelled as “effective” in the Appendix) as
the separation between pre- and post-treatment. Legislation establishes this date at least by
the time it is enacted, therefore giving a period on average of six months for the population
to adjust their employment/residency plans according to their expectations. Therefore, even
in states such as Oklahoma where legal challenges postponed complete implementation of
the immigration legislation, these expectations and accordingly adjusted plans presumably
still have an effect as far as population and employment movements resulting from the
omnibus laws.

Assuming an implementation month of ,
1 represents one month prior to implementation,
2
represents two months prior to implementation, and so on. The results of t-tests for portions of employment
are not reported, but are available upon request from the author; these results are highly similar to those of
population.
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Two additional aspects of my empirical strategy address specific critiques as to the
preciseness of difference-in-differences estimation expressed in the recent literature. First,
by aggregating population and employment data at the state level rather than including
individual-level observations from the CPS in the specified regressions, I avoid the
problem of common group errors presented by multilevel data emphasized in Donald and
Lang (2007). In addition, I follow the recommendations of Bertrand et al. (2004) in
calculating Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by state for inference purposes,
allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations within states and thereby
accounting for the serious concern of serial correlation in the data.
Results and Discussion
Of the 52 demographic groups identified by the three indicators in this study, Passel
and Cohn's figures help point to the group of 'noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after
1982/Hispanic/low-skilled' as containing the highest percentage of undocumented
population, and in turn theoretically most likely to be negatively affected in terms of
population and/or employment by state immigration law implementation. In documenting
the migratory outflows associated with the state omnibus laws, I include estimates in
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 for this narrowest demographic, as well as the following broader
demographic divisions, in descending order of expected percentage of undocumented
population:

'noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived

'noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived

to

U.S.

to

U.S.

after

1982,'

after

1982/Hispanic,'

'noncitizen/foreign-born/

Hispanic/low-skilled,' 'noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic,' and 'noncitizen/foreign-born.'13

13

All estimates related to employment numbers are available in the Appendix.
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In attempting to gauge the impact of the laws and any subsequent immigrant
movements on the behavior of other demographic groups, I focus on several segments of
the population with no undocumented individuals that economic theory has presented as
possible substitutes for the already-mentioned groups with the highest percentages of
undocumented immigrants.14 Borjas et al. (2011) argues that similarly-skilled immigrants
and natives are perfect substitutes according to U.S. labor evidence, while Card (2009)
suggests that if immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes, additional immigrants
would be the group designated as nearest-to-perfect substitute for immigrants already
present in the U.S.. I take both findings to the data in the context of my study, documenting
the following demographic groups' population changes in Table 1.6 and employment
changes in Table 1.7: 'native/Hispanic/low-skilled,' 'native/white, non-Hispanic/lowskilled,' and 'native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled' in order to capture any nativeimmigrant substitutability, and 'naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled' in
order to capture any immigrant-immigrant substitutability. To further shed light on the
population and employment movement responses to immigration law, I also include the
total change of state population (employment) associated with implementation of the
legislation.
Impacts on Population
Figure 1.1 gives an idea as to the migratory outflows of immigrants in terms of
population during the implementation period of omnibus immigration legislation.
However, although an average decline in the examined demographic's proportion is
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By substitutes, I refer to the terminology used in labor economics, which identifies groups that tend to
substitute or complement one another, classified according to characteristics such as citizenship status,
race/ethnicity, and skill level.
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observed in the six months after implementation, this decrease is evidence from raw data
not yet taking advantage of the treatment and control difference-in-differences
methodology necessary for obtaining the desired estimates of interest. Panel A of Table 4
shows the impact on population associated with the immigration law implementation for
those demographic groups having the highest percentages of undocumented immigrants. I
estimate that the implementation of omnibus laws is associated with a 24.41% decrease in
the low-skilled, Hispanic, noncitizen population arriving post-1982 to the US, when
comparing states receiving treatment to those geographic neighbors not receiving
treatment.15 While this group is the group weighted most heavily with undocumented
immigrants, even the group of foreign-born noncitizens, which certainly has a much lower
percentage of undocumented population, experiences a decline of 9.93% associated with
the law implementation. When the alternative control group of all US states is used,
minimizing the possible bias created by expected inflows to neighboring states, the
magnitude of these effects are only slightly attenuated, 19.02% and 8.22%, respectively.
Interestingly, since the total population also experiences an associated decrease, albeit
small in magnitude, the proportion changes detailed in Panel B of Table 1.4 are smaller in
percentage terms than their Panel A level counterparts. All estimates in Table 1.4 are
statistically significant at the 5% level, indeed pointing to a strong outflow of
(undocumented) immigrant population in response to the state omnibus immigration laws.
Estimates in Table 1.6 outline the impact on those groups identified by economic
theory as possible substitutes for immigrant groups, therefore leading to an expectation of
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The estimates reported approximate percentage changes, as population (employment) is expressed in
logarithmic form and estimates are then multiplied by a factor of 100.
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inflows associated with immigrant outflows. However, of the four groups examined, only
the native, black/non-Hispanic, low-skilled group has an associated population increase,
magnitude of 6.51%. Both native and naturalized citizen groups of low-skilled Hispanics
actually reflect a clear population decline, losing 11.57% and 4.70% respectively. While
these estimates are not as significant as those in Table 1.4, the evidence does point to a lack
of 'replacement' population for the outflow of immigrants. This fact is confirmed by the
slightly negative estimates for total state population, -0.61% when employing the regional
control group and -0.45% when including all U.S. states. The negative impact on groups
not targeted by omnibus legislation is a noteworthy finding, likely due to one or both of
two possibilities. First, low-skilled, Hispanic legal immigrants (or natives) may be
suffering a type of workplace discrimination. As some of the omnibus legislation affects
employers directly, some employers may be more reluctant to hire any worker who fits
whatever profile the employer may associate with undocumented workers. On the other
hand, this result could reflect that individuals in this demographic anticipate discriminatory
treatment as a result of the immigration laws and therefore relocate, or simply decide not
to live and work in a place where laws could unfortunately lead to instances of racial
profiling. An additional consideration mentioned in Raphael and Ronconi (2009) is the fact
that some immigrant families are made up of both undocumented and documented
immigrants, leading to the out-migration of all family members when the undocumented
are targeted by immigration law. In either case, these figures point to a central complaint
of opponents of the state omnibus immigration laws - that on top of the negative effect on
undocumented immigrants, the legislation most likely has an unintended, adverse effect on
certain segments of the legal, documented immigrant population.
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Impacts on Employment
Figure 1.2 outlines the migratory outflows of immigrants in terms of employment
during the implementation period of omnibus immigration legislation. Panel A of Table
1.5 displays estimates for the immigrant demographic groups' that reflect a decline in
employment associated with implementation of the immigration laws. Estimates range
from -20.73% to -10.62%, evidencing a notable fall in employment, however generally
slightly smaller in magnitude than that of these same groups' population change using the
regional control group. In line with the population estimates, use of all U.S. states as the
control group results in employment estimates of a lower magnitude for the examined
immigrant demographic groups, with the largest effect being -16.32% for the noncitizen,
Hispanic, low-skilled, arrived to U.S. post-1982 group. Once again, estimates for these
groups are statistically significant, with only that of noncitizen/Hispanic not being
significant at least the 10% level, the majority significant at the 5% level.
In examining the possible substitute groups listed in Table 1.7, the estimates for
employment highlight two important trends. First, the immigration legislation again
appears to adversely affect segments of the population other than those groups with high
percentages of undocumented immigrants, even groups that are hypothesized to be
substitutes for the immigrant groups. Panel A of Table 1.7 shows a 10.89% and a 14.60%
decrease in employment level, respectively, for native, low-skilled Hispanics and
naturalized citizen, low-skilled Hispanics when using regional control groups. While these
estimates do vary when changing to all U.S. states as the control group of choice, they
remain clearly negative. The same two possibilities hypothesized above in the discussion
of the population estimates provide the clearest explanation as to why this result obtains.
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Second, for the group of native, low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics), there does appear to
be some substitute or replacement effect in terms of employment. Estimates of 7.79% and
10.68% for the regional and overall controls, respectively, signal a positive impact on
employment for this demographic. However, this rise in employment is not shared by
native, low-skilled whites (non-Hispanics), and the estimates throughout Table 1.7 are
plagued by lower significance compared with those of Table 1.5. In fact, the overall gauge
of the impact on employment, the estimate for the state total, is slightly negative using both
control groups, just as in the case of population.
Checks on Initial Estimates
While the above estimates paint a relatively clear picture of the migratory responses
to state immigration law implementation, the skeptical reader may raise concerns as to
several issues worth addressing, including the robustness, sensitivity, and reliability of the
estimates.
Robustness and Sensitivity
To this point, results obtain through the examination of a one-year implementation
period, including all implementing states according to their effective date even if the actual
implementation faces delays due to legal challenges. In order to first check the robustness
of these results, I explore what changes may occur if Oklahoma's effective date of
November 2007 is excluded from the treatment group. As detailed in the Appendix, the
courts initially prevented a major section of Oklahoma's omnibus law from taking effect.
As previously explained, I include Oklahoma in the initial treatment group based on those
expectations that accompany the effective date, even if not all sections of the omnibus
legislation ultimately take effect on this date. However, examining a second set of
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regressions excluding Oklahoma allows for a simple check of whether the initial results are
unduly influenced by Oklahoma's inclusion.
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 clearly show that the baseline results are robust to the exclusion
of Oklahoma's effective date from the treatment group. The coefficients displayed in Table
1.8 show all negative estimates larger in magnitude than those of Tables 1.4 and 1.5. This
makes logical sense, since some immigrants waiting until the last moment (the expected
effective date) to out-migrate may have opted to remain in Oklahoma when the
employment section of this particular legislation did not take immediate effect, resulting in
a smaller outflow than that which would have otherwise occurred. As in Table 1.4, all
population estimates are significant at the 5% level, however unlike Table 1.5, all
employment estimates are now significant at the 5% level, as well. Comparing Table 1.9
with the corresponding Tables 1.6 and 1.7, population estimates in Table 1.9 are larger in
magnitude (both positive and negative), with no changes in sign from the previous tables.
For example, using the regional control results in a 14.53% decrease for native, low-skilled
Hispanics and an 11.44% increase for native, low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics). On the
other hand, Table 1.9 lists somewhat attenuated employment estimates for the regional
control, all coefficients consistent in sign with the exception of native, low-skilled whites
(non-Hispanics). Estimates for the change in total population (employment) are consistent
with the baseline regressions, ranging from -0.36% to -0.57%, although just as before the
estimates for 'natives' are not as significant as those for 'immigrants.'
Turning to the issue of timing, I examine how sensitive the results are to changing
the length of the implementation period. Tables 1.10 and 1.11 display the estimates of
interest given a total implementation period of 6 months in Panel A, while estimates from
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total implementation periods of 2 years are in Panel B.16 Six-month population and
employment coefficients from Table 1.10 are extremely similar in magnitude and
significance to those of Tables 1.4 and 1.5, however two-year coefficients are less
significant and attenuated in magnitude, employment estimates for foreign-born noncitizens turning slightly positive. While the magnitude and significance vary for six-month
estimates in Table 1.11, all signs remain consistent with those from Tables 1.6 and 1.7
except for population estimates related to naturalized, low-skilled Hispanics. Two-year
coefficients paint the same picture as the corresponding six-month estimates, however
there is additional sign disagreement in the estimates for native, low-skilled blacks (nonHispanics). In summary, while the baseline results do show some sensitivity to altering the
length of the examined implementation period, both the six-month and two-year samples
confirm general trends and resulting conclusions, the six-month results even matching
those of the baseline regressions in magnitude and significance.
Endogeneity Bias?
An important concern as to the reliability of the difference-in-differences estimates
is the issue of endogeneity. The implementation of state omnibus immigration legislation
must be exogenous in order for the estimates to capture the true effect on population and
employment, free from any endogeneity bias. Raphael and Ronconi (2009) addresses this
concern in detail, pointing to evidence from the Pew Hispanic Center's National Survey of
Latinos (NSL) as discounting the possibility that the laws' implementation are actually
driven by other changes, leading to a problem of endogeneity. They examine both the
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These are equivalent to a pre- and post-implementation period of 3 months each and 1 year each,
respectively, compared with the baseline regressions using a pre- and post-implementation period of 6
months each.
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possibility of higher levels of discriminatory attitudes as well as that of changes in levels
of discriminatory attitudes leading to immigration law implementation; however, through
the data provided by the NSL both of these possible arguments of endogeneity are
discarded.
An additional cause of endogeneity could arise from the simple case of the
(undocumented) immigrant population increasing in size to a certain percentage of a state's
total population, arriving to a tipping point which in turn triggers the beginnings of the
process of immigration law enactment and implementation.17 It is common knowledge that
a network effect indeed exists in the migration decision, resulting in regions with high
percentages of immigrants tending to draw more immigrants.18 However, while the
network effect could point to a tipping point eventually obtaining, its existence is clearly
not sufficient for the tipping point to obtain. In fact, evidence from Passel and Cohn (2009)
refutes the tipping point theory, citing the fact that the 'undocumented immigrant
population grew rapidly from 1991 to 2006 but has since stabilized.' Since this stabilization
occurred prior to the influx of state omnibus immigration legislation, any hesitation as to
endogeneity is somewhat pacified. However, to further examine this possibility, especially
given the fact that a lag between stabilization and immigration legislation implementation
could occur, I again examine the narrowest demographic - noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived
to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/ low-skilled - specifically, I examine the exact proportion of
17

One might imagine a different sort of tipping point, in which the (undocumented) immigrant population
increases in size until it gains sufficient political power to in turn influence immigration policy away from
omnibus legislation. However, I examine the tipping point in terms of triggering omnibus legislation due to
the fact that many immigrants (clearly, undocumented immigrants) do not have voting rights in the US and
therefore have minimal political clout.
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For a sample of the literature examining network effects and the migration decision, see McKenzie and
Rapoport (2007).
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each state's population made up by this group, measured one year before implementation
of omnibus legislation. This date serves as an approximate marker for when the legislative
process of proposing and discussing new legislation actually takes place. Figure 1.3 (Figure
1.4) shows the corresponding proportions of population (employment) for each state
implementing omnibus law, along with the proportions of the same demographic group for
all other states not implementing immigration law during the same period. Table 1.12 lists
the rank of each proportion compared to all other state counterparts for the same time
period.
Confirming the evidence from Passel and Cohn (2009), there does not appear to be
a tipping point that sets in motion the adoption of omnibus immigration legislation, as the
proportions exhibit a wide variety in their rankings. Using regional states as a comparison
group, Georgia, Utah, and Arizona each rank third in the population measure among their
respective regions, however Missouri, Oklahoma, and South Carolina rank in the bottom
half of their regions, South Carolina ranking only ninth out of eleven. Regional
employment rankings reflect much the same, although Nebraska joins the group of lowranking states. Switching to all US states as a comparison group, Arizona and Utah both
experience relatively high overall proportions of population (employment) of the targeted
demographic group one year before implementation, however other implementing states
can be classified as having relatively moderate or low proportions. Missouri, South
Carolina, and Oklahoma certainly qualify as having relatively low proportions of both
population and employment, with overall population rankings of 27, 26, and 27,
respectively. Additionally, Nebraska's overall rank of 30 for employment is the lowest
statistic among the legislation-implementing states.
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Table 1.13 outlines a further test providing evidence against the tipping point
theory. Panel A displays the results of regressing the implementation of state immigration
law on the one-year lag of the narrowest demographic proportion detailed above, while
Panel B shows the results of regressing the implementation of state immigration law on the
one-year lag of the change in the narrowest demographic proportion. Any positive
relationship between this (change in) proportion and subsequent immigration law
implementation should clearly appear as positive, significant coefficients in the regression
results. However, coefficients are insignificant and imprecisely estimated, each respective
95% confidence interval including the possibility of both a negative and a positive
relationship between the two respective variables. Furthermore, if these estimates were
significant and precisely estimated, the association between the variables would remain
small in scale given the interpretation of the estimates. The highest coefficient in magnitude
in Panel A signals that even a one-unit increase in the narrowest demographic proportion
(not possible since the independent variable is a proportion measured between zero and
one) is only associated with a 51% increase in the probability that a state implements
omnibus immigration legislation. Correspondingly, the coefficient of highest magnitude in
Panel B signals that a one-unit increase in the change of the narrowest demographic
proportion is associated with a 24% decrease in the probability that a state implements
omnibus legislation.
Together with the evidence provided by Raphael and Ronconi (2009) and Passel
and Cohn (2009), these trends (or lack thereof) strongly signal that the tipping point theory
is not in line with empirical fact. The identified empirical strategy and resulting estimates
are indeed free from worries of endogeneity, thereby contributing a reliable estimation of
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the effect of immigration legislation on population and employment of the examined
demographic groups.
Conclusion
The estimated impact of the implementation of state omnibus immigration
legislation on total state population and employment is consistently slightly negative,
ranging from -0.45% to -0.61% for population and -0.52% to -0.77% for employment.
While somewhat imprecisely measured, these estimates' 95% confidence intervals indicate
that they are almost certainly negative in sign, leaving only a relatively small possibility of
any positive relationship. With the exception of native, low-skilled blacks (non-Hispanics),
there appears to be no substitution in terms of inflows from those demographic groups
predicted by theory as being probable substitutes for the undocumented immigrant
population. Some of these groups actually experience an adverse impact on population and
employment associated with implementation of the immigration legislation. This adverse
impact is in addition to the highly statistically significant immigrant outflows of up to
nearly a quarter of the corresponding population, as large as 24.41% in terms of population
and 20.71% in terms of employment for the examined 'immigrant' demographic groups.
These findings point to the fact that omnibus legislation not only has a negative
effect on the undocumented population, but it also unintentionally harms a much broader
segment of the population. With substitution inflows on a smaller scale than the
corresponding outflows, the empirical evidence clearly does not support the proimmigration law partner statements of 'immigrants take natives' jobs' and 'if you want to
create a job for a U.S. citizen tomorrow, deport an illegal alien today.' This combination of
adverse effects on population and employment at three demographic levels - the
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undocumented population, the affected 'substitute' groups that actually do not substitute,
and the total state populations - deserves careful consideration from not only economists,
but from the wider policymaking community as well. As increasing the welfare related to
states' population, especially in terms of employment, is the very reason posited by
policymakers as justification for immigration law implementation, this trifecta of adverse
effects leaves little doubt that state omnibus immigration legislation is not completing its
stated mission.
Appendix
1. Georgia SB-529
• Enacted 17 April 2006; effective 1 July 2007
• Work authorization, penalty for human trafficking, local immigration law
enforcement, determination of legal status when arrested, eliminates public
benefits
2. Oklahoma HB-1804
• Enacted 8 May 2007; effective 1 November 2007
• Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, local immigration law
enforcement, felony to harbor/transport unauthorized immigrants, eliminates
public benefits
• Legal Challenge
– Employment section barred from taking effect, except for E-Verify
system
3. Missouri HB-1549
• Enacted 7 July 2008; effective 28 August 2008 (1 January 2009)

26

• Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, local immigration law
enforcement, eliminates public benefits
4. South Carolina HB-4400
• Enacted 4 June 2008; effective 4 June 2008 (except for work authorization effective 1 January 2009)
• Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, local immigration law
enforcement, eliminates public benefits, education restrictions
5. Utah SB-81
• Enacted 13 March 2008; effective 1 July 2009
• Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, local immigration law
enforcement, eliminates public benefits
6. Georgia HB-2
• Enacted 11 May 2009; effective 1 January 2010
• Work authorization, determination of legal status when arrested, eliminates
public benefits
7. Missouri HB-390
• Enacted 7 July 2009; effective 7 July 2009
• Work authorization, public benefits, education restrictions
8. Nebraska LB-403
• Enacted 8 April 2009; effective 1 October 2009
• Work authorization, eliminates public benefits
9. Arizona SB-1070, HB-2162
• Enacted 23 April 2010; effective 29 July 10
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• Work authorization, local immigration law enforcement, warrantless arrest,
citizens can sue agencies for nocompliance, document-carrying policy
• Legal challenge by U.S. Department of Justice
– Three provisions preliminarily barred from taking effect
– Pending appeal by Arizona governor Jan Brewer
10. Utah H116, H466, H469, H497
• Enacted 15 March 2011; effective
• Work authorization, immigrant integration, proposed temporary worker program
by 2013
• Legal challenge by Utah Coalition of La Raza
– H497 temporarily restrained
11. Georgia HB-87
• Enacted 13 May 2011; effective 1 July 2011 (except public benefits - effective 1
July 2012)
• Work authorization, local immigration law enforcement, eliminates public
benefits
• Legal challenge by Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights et al.
– Two provisions enjoined preliminarily
12. Indiana SB-590
• Enacted 10 May 2011; effective 1 July 2011
• Work authorization, eliminates public benefits, requests reimbursement of
'immigrant cost' from federal government
• Legal challenge by Ingrid Buquer, et al.
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– Two provisions enjoined preliminarily
13. Alabama HB-56
• Enacted 9 June 2011; effective 1 September 2011
• Work authorization, local immigration law enforcement, felony to harbor/rent to
unauthorized immigrants, document-carrying policy, questioning of legal status in
public schools
• Legal challenge by US Department of Justice
– Two provisions barred from taking effect 14 October 2011
14. South Carolina S-20
• Enacted 27 June 2011; effective 1 January 2012
• Work authorization, identification/driver's licenses, eliminates public benefits,
felony to harbor/rent to unauthorized immigrants
• Legal challenge by US Department of Justice
– Pending challenge filed 31 October 2011

Table 1.1. Enacted state immigration laws: 2005 to 2011
________________________________________________________________________
Issue
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Education
3
3
22
12
27
17
20
Employment
5
14
29
19
21
27
27
Health
0
0
14
11
28
17
23
Human Trafficking
9
13
18
5
16
8
5
ID/Driver’s License
10
6
40
32
46
26
27
Law Enforcement
5
8
16
12
16
37
39
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Miscellaneous
Omnibus
Public Benefits
Voting
Total Passed by Legislature
Vetoed by Governor
Total Enacted

7
0
5
1
45
6
39

11
1
10
6
72
6
66

17
1
33
0
190
12
178

38
3
9
1
142
3
139

46
3
15
4
222
20
202

69
2
9
6
218
10
208

31
6
15
4
197
15
182

Table 1.2. Pre-implementation characteristics of states, regional control
________________________________________________________________________
Treatment group
Control group (regional)
Time prior to implementation Mean Std. error
Mean Std. error
T-test
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled
6
3.13 0.87
3.11 0.32
-0.02
5
3.48 0.93
3.08 0.31
-0.40
4
3.57 0.94
3.01 0.30
-0.56
3
3.50 0.95
3.01 0.31
-0.49

30

2
3.52 1.02
1
3.30 0.81
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled
6
2.69 1.52
5
2.34 1.24
4
2.55 1.38
3
2.08 1.01
2
2.11 0.96
1
2.25 1.19
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
6
24.80 2.35
5
24.39 2.22
4
24.91 2.51
3
26.47 2.49
2
25.97 2.42
1
26.11 2.51
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
6
5.31 2.13
5
5.61 2.39
4
5.92 2.41
3
6.01 2.39
2
5.99 2.47
1
5.72 2.36

3.07
3.11

0.31
0.31

-0.44
-0.19

2.55
2.49
2.43
2.48
2.52
2.62

0.47
0.45
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.49

-0.09
0.10
-0.08
0.27
0.27
0.24

26.93
26.80
26.75
26.77
26.92
27.02

1.06
1.06
1.04
1.03
1.05
1.07

0.62
0.70
0.54
0.09
0.28
0.26

5.47
5.58
5.53
5.42
5.37
5.29

0.71
0.73
0.72
0.71
0.71
0.69

0.07
-0.01
-0.16
-0.25
-0.26
-0.19

Notes: Means and standard errors express the percentage of each demographic group in the respective total
state populations (population shares multiplied by 100). Time prior to implementation corresponds to an
implementation month of ,
1 is one month prior,
2 is two months prior, etc.

Table 1.3. Pre-implementation characteristics of states, national control
________________________________________________________________________
Treatment group
Control group (national)
Time prior to implementation Mean Std. error
Mean Std. error
T-test
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to US after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled
6
3.13 0.87
3.05 0.27
-0.08
5
3.48 0.93
3.04 0.15
-0.40
4
3.57 0.94
2.94 0.15
-0.60
3
3.50 0.95
2.94 0.15
-0.54
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2
3.52 1.02
1
3.30 0.81
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled
6
2.69 1.52
5
2.34 1.24
4
2.55 1.38
3
2.08 1.01
2
2.11 0.96
1
2.25 1.19
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
6
24.80 2.35
5
24.39 2.22
4
24.91 2.51
3
26.47 2.49
2
25.97 2.42
1
26.11 2.51
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
6
5.31 2.13
5
5.61 2.39
4
5.92 2.41
3
6.01 2.39
2
5.99 2.47
1
5.72 2.36

3.00
3.01

0.15
0.15

-0.46
-0.30

2.39
2.39
2.38
2.38
2.38
2.45

0.32
0.18
0.18
0.19
0.18
0.19

-0.24
0.01
-0.05
0.16
0.17
0.36

26.32
26.31
26.28
26.15
26.18
26.23

0.51
0.51
0.51
0.51
0.52
0.52

0.44
0.59
0.34
-0.03
0.06
0.04

4.51
4.59
4.55
4.49
4.58
4.46

0.27
0.28
0.28
0.27
0.28
0.27

-0.43
-0.56
-0.73
-0.81
-0.82
-0.67

Notes: Means and standard errors express the percentage of each demographic group in the respective total
state populations (population shares multiplied by 100). Time prior to implementation corresponds to an
implementation month of ,
1 is one month prior,
2 is two months prior, etc.

Table 1.4. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus
immigration laws on population: immigrants
A. 100
(population level)
B. 100
(population proportion)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled
-24.41
-19.02
-23.75
-18.51
. .
(6.59)
(6.75)
(6.59)
(6.75)
0.96
0.96
0.90
0.90
901
3676
901
3676
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic
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-22.92
-19.27
. .
(6.59)
(6.78)
0.97
0.97
910
3763
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982
-14.03
-11.39
. .
(4.37)
(4.02)
0.98
0.98
924
3874
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled
-19.57
-14.42
. .
(5.96)
(5.89)
0.97
0.97
909
3707
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic
-18.36
-14.75
. .
(5.92)
(5.93)
0.98
0.97
913
3771
Noncitizen/foreign-born
-9.93
-8.22
. .
(3.92)
(3.54)
0.98
0.98
924
3874
Control
Region
All

-22.26
(6.60)
0.93
910

-18.79
(6.79)
0.91
3763

-13.42
(4.38)
0.92
924

-10.94
(4.08)
0.93
3874

-18.92
(5.96)
0.91
909

-13.92
(5.89)
0.91
3707

-17.71
(5.92)
0.93
913

-14.28
(5.93)
0.92
3771

-9.33
(3.92)
0.93
924
Region

-7.77
(3.58)
0.93
3874
All

Notes: Panel A (B): Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the (proportion of the) log of
population of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-year combinations as the dependent
variable. Population includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60. All
regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across
states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates
using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control. Huber-White robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations
within states. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are excluded from the control groups.
The estimate reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months post-implementation and the
treatment indicator.

Table 1.5. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus
immigration laws on employment: immigrants
A. 100
(employment level)
B. 100
(employment proportion)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled
-20.73
-16.32
-21.17
-17.03
. .
(7.34)
(7.08)
(7.22)
(7.08)
0.95
0.96
0.89
0.88
899
3627
899
3627
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic
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-19.52
-16.42
. .
(7.55)
(7.25)
0.96
0.96
904
3715
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982
-12.89
-9.12
. .
(4.98)
(4.50)
0.98
0.98
923
3870
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled
-16.59
-13.92
. .
(6.61)
(6.18)
0.96
0.96
907
3670
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic
-15.23
-13.29
. .
(6.78)
(6.37)
0.97
0.97
907
3731
Noncitizen/foreign-born
-10.62
-7.90
. .
(4.48)
(4.07)
0.98
0.98
924
3871
Control
Region
All

-19.96
(7.44)
0.90
904

-17.16
(7.20)
0.89
3715

-13.41
(4.83)
0.91
923

-9.89
(4.45)
0.92
3870

-17.03
(6.46)
0.90
907

-14.63
(6.17)
0.89
3670

-15.67
(6.65)
0.91
907

-14.02
(6.31)
0.90
3731

-11.14
(4.33)
0.92
924
Region

-8.67
(4.00)
0.93
3871
All

Notes: Panel A (B): Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the (proportion of the) log of
employment of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-year combinations as the dependent
variable. Employment includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60.
All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences
across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports
estimates using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control. HuberWhite robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across
observations within states. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are excluded from the
control groups. The estimate reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months postimplementation and the treatment indicator.

Table 1.6. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus
immigration laws on population: natives
A. 100
(population level)
B. 100
(population proportion)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled
-11.57
-7.16
-10.97
-6.71
. .
(7.28)
(6.92)
(7.32)
(6.97)
0.95
0.96
0.92
0.91
886
3791
886
3791
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
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-0.93
-0.36
-0.32
0.09
. .
(1.18)
(1.21)
(1.14)
(1.24)
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.98
924
3876
924
3876
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
6.51
5.80
7.11
6.23
. .
(5.40)
(5.24)
(5.30)
(5.11)
0.98
0.98
0.96
0.95
894
3715
894
3715
Naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled
-4.70
-7.68
-3.99
-7.22
. .
(8.36)
(8.08)
(8.27)
(7.96)
0.93
0.93
0.83
0.81
816
3483
816
3483
Total
-0.61
-0.45
----. .
(0.38)
(0.46)
----0.99
0.99
----924
3876
----________________________________________________________________________
Control
Region
All
Region
All
Notes: Panel A (B): Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the (proportion of the) log of
population of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-year combinations as the dependent
variable. Population includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60. All
regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across
states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates
using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control. Huber-White robust
standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across observations
within states. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are excluded from the control groups.
The estimate reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months post-implementation and the
treatment indicator.

Table 1.7. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus
immigration laws on employment: natives
A. 100
(employment level) B. 100
(employment proportion)
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled
-10.89
-4.05
-11.46
-4.82
. .
(10.28)
(10.45)
(10.30)
(10.54)
0.94
0.95
0.90
0.89
872
3735
872
3735
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
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0.73
2.10
0.21
1.33
. .
(1.44)
(1.36)
(1.35)
(1.30)
0.99
0.99
0.97
0.97
924
3876
924
3876
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
7.79
10.68
7.24
9.93
. .
(6.54)
(5.80)
(6.56)
(5.74)
0.97
0.97
0.95
0.93
872
3612
872
3612
Naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled
-14.60
-16.48
-15.14
-17.47
. .
(9.06)
(7.84)
(8.93)
(7.79)
0.92
0.92
0.83
0.79
826
3397
826
3397
Total
-0.52
-0.77
----. .
(0.58)
(0.58)
----0.99
0.99
----924
3876
----________________________________________________________________________
Control
Region
All
Region
All
Notes: Panel A (B): Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the (proportion of the) log of
employment of the corresponding demographic group for state-month-year combinations as the dependent
variable. Employment includes all CPS data (using given sampling weights) for individuals ages 20 to 60.
All regressions include state and month-year effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences
across states as well as any differences over time that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports
estimates using the regional control groups, while column (2) employs all U.S. states as a control. HuberWhite robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, allowing for unrestricted error correlations across
observations within states. States having previously adopted omnibus legislation are excluded from the
control groups. The estimate reported is the interaction between the indicator for 1 to 6 months postimplementation and the treatment indicator.

Table 1.8. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus
immigration laws on population and employment (no Oklahoma): immigrants
A. Population
B. Employment
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled
-31.05
-26.25
-19.37
-18.01
. .
(6.47)
(6.84)
(6.72)
(7.85)
0.97
0.96
0.96
0.96
781
3117
779
3073
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic
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-28.88
-25.41
. .
(6.71)
(7.12)
0.98
0.97
790
3189
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982
-16.49
-14.53
. .
(4.59)
(4.13)
0.98
0.98
804
3286
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled
-27.38
-23.01
. .
(5.80)
(5.85)
0.97
0.97
789
3147
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic
-25.27
-22.19
. .
(5.95)
(6.14)
0.98
0.97
793
3196
Noncitizen/foreign-born
-13.24
-12.30
. .
(4.09)
(3.58)
0.98
0.98
804
3286
Control
Region
All

-18.55
(7.06)
0.97
784

-18.58
(8.06)
0.96
3149

-12.60
(4.79)
0.98
803

-11.17
(4.66)
0.98
3282

-15.54
(6.17)
0.97
787

-14.97
(6.85)
0.96
3113

-14.45
(6.41)
0.97
787

-14.82
(7.08)
0.97
3162

-10.42
(4.33)
0.98
804
Region

-9.97
(4.19)
0.98
3283
All

Notes: Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, excluding Oklahoma's effective date of
November 2007 from the treatment group. In addition, I report only population and employment levels, not
proportions. Panel A displays estimates associated with population, while Panel B displays estimates
associated with employment.

Table 1.9. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus
immigration laws on population and employment (no Oklahoma): natives
A. Population
B. Employment
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled
-14.53
-11.49
-11.27
-10.71
. .
(7.88)
(7.47)
(10.17)
(9.89)
0.95
0.96
0.94
0.95
774
3223
761
3173
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
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-0.67
-0.24
. .
(1.23)
(1.39)
0.99
0.99
804
3288
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
11.44
8.58
. .
(6.08)
(5.96)
0.98
0.98
774
3159
Naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled
-6.25
-10.27
. .
(8.79)
(8.05)
0.93
0.93
707
2961
Total
-0.45
-0.36
. .
(0.42)
(0.49)
0.99
0.99
804
3288

0.85
(1.41)
0.99
804

1.28
(1.45)
0.99
3288

8.18
(6.64)
0.97
753

12.66
(6.64)
0.97
3069

-11.65
(8.55)
0.92
694

-17.00
(7.94)
0.92
2882

-0.57
(0.57)
0.99
804

-0.47
(0.59)
0.99
3288

Control

Region

All

Region

All

Notes: Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 1.6 and 1.7, excluding Oklahoma's effective date of
November 2007 from the treatment group. In addition, I report only population and employment levels, not
proportions. Panel A displays estimates associated with population, while Panel B displays estimates
associated with employment.

Table 1.10. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus
immigration laws on population and employment: immigrants
A. Six-month implementation period B. Two-year implementation period
Population
Employment
Population
Employment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
________________________________________________________________________
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic/low-skilled
-24.75 -19.29
-10.09 -14.60
-7.11 -6.38
-4.63 -2.38
. .
(9.54) (10.57)
(8.81) (10.38) (5.08) (5.23)
(5.95) (6.19)
0.97
0.97
0.96
0.96
0.96 0.96
0.95
0.96
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454
1846
457
1817
1751
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982/Hispanic
-21.97 -16.54
-12.10 -16.89
-8.26
. .
(9.38) (10.70)
(8.93) (10.12) (5.11)
0.98
0.97
0.97
0.96
0.97
459
1883
459
1854
1765
Noncitizen/foreign-born/arrived to U.S. after 1982
-10.90 -8.71
-9.55 -11.24 -5.07
. .
(6.25) (5.86)
(6.46) (5.89)
(3.15)
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
462
1936
462
1934
1801
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled
-22.28 -17.71
-10.85 -14.74
-3.60
. .
(8.54) (9.05)
(8.40) (9.21)
(4.56)
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.96
0.96
455
1860
460
1839
1760
Noncitizen/foreign-born/Hispanic
-19.32 -14.56
-11.59 -15.53
-5.27
. .
(8.24) (9.23)
(8.20) (9.15)
(4.52)
0.98
0.97
0.97
0.97
0.97
459
1886
460
1863
1768
Noncitizen/foreign-born
-8.60 -7.51
-8.10 -10.36
-1.98
. .
(5.57) (5.19)
(5.76) (5.49)
(2.84)
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
0.98
462
1936
462
1934
1801
Control

Region All

Region All

7216

1737

7117

-8.96
(5.08)
0.97
7392

-6.51
(6.05)
0.95
1747

-5.75
(6.13)
0.96
7285

-4.17
(3.04)
0.98
7629

-2.50
(3.59)
0.98
1795

-2.41
(3.55)
0.98
7617

-2.84
(4.65)
0.97
7263

-1.10
(5.24)
0.95
1747

-0.86
(5.41)
0.96
7178

-5.77
(4.47)
0.97
7405

-3.43
(5.35)
0.96
1751

-2.62
(5.40)
0.96
7314

-1.34
(2.71)
0.98
7629

0.42
(3.27)
0.98
1798

0.31
(3.21)
0.98
7623

Region All

Region All

Notes: Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 1.4 and 1.5, however resulting from either six-month
or two-year total implementation periods. Panel A displays estimates associated the six-month window, while
Panel B displays estimates associated with the two-year window. I report only population and employment
levels, not proportions.

Table 1.11. Difference-in-differences estimates of the impact of state omnibus
immigration laws on population and employment: natives
A. Six-month implementation period B. Two-year implementation period
Population
Employment
Population
Employment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
________________________________________________________________________
Native/Hispanic/low-skilled
-24.60 -21.30
-2.45 -12.28
-4.75 -2.56
-7.98 -5.70
. .
(10.57) (9.87)
(13.58) (13.32) (6.20) (5.91)
(7.12) (6.73)
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.96
0.95 0.96
0.94
0.95
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446
1900
449
1875
Native/white, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
-3.23 -2.89
-2.72 -0.30
. .
(1.37) (1.61)
(2.27) (2.02)
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
462
1938
462
1938
Native/black, non-Hispanic/low-skilled
5.10
4.16
13.17 15.59
. .
(7.81) (7.27)
(10.62) (8.54)
0.98
0.98
0.97
0.97
448
1858
433
1818
Naturalized citizen/foreign-born/Hispanic/low-skilled
6.51
6.64
-1.05 -3.15
. .
(11.49) (11.63)
(12.22) (12.40)
0.93
0.93
0.94
0.92
411
1735
417
1691
Total
-0.65 -0.54
-0.45 -1.04
. .
(0.43) (0.58)
(0.62) (0.50)
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
462
1938
462
1938
Control

Region All

Region All

1729

7463

1701

7354

-0.59
(0.90)
0.99
1801

-0.43
(0.89)
0.99
7632

-1.55
(1.07)
0.99
1799

-1.40
(1.04)
0.99
7632

0.47
(4.20)
0.98
1743

-1.75
(4.08)
0.98
7329

0.33
(4.73)
0.97
1696

-0.05
(4.68)
0.97
7104

8.55
(6.20)
0.92
1589

4.03
(5.83)
0.93
6818

-1.81 5.97
(3.05) (6.38)
0.91
0.92
1565 6618

0.06
(0.28)
0.99
1801

0.09
(0.34)
0.99
7632

0.26
(0.43)
0.99
1799

Region All

0.12
(0.44)
0.99
7632

Region All

Notes: Estimates correspond to those found in Tables 1.6 and 1.7, however resulting from either six-month
or two-year total implementation periods. Panel A displays estimates associated with the six-month window,
while Panel B displays estimates associated with the two-year window. I report only population and
employment levels, not proportions.

Table 1.12. Rankings one year before implementation
________________________________________________________________________
State
Population
Employment
Georgia
3/12 9/49
3/12 8/49
Oklahoma
7/10 27/49
8/10 28/49
Missouri
6/11 27/44
8/11 25/44
South Carolina
9/11 26/44
8/11 25/44
Utah
3/10 4/44
3/10 4/44
Nebraska
4/11 21/44
7/11 30/44
Arizona
3/10 4/44
3/10 5/44
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Group of Comparison

Region All

Region All

Notes: Population (employment) is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving
to the US after 1982 among the total population (employed) in each state (ages 20 to 60), with a ranking of
one designating the highest proportion.

Table 1.13. Estimates of the impact of the narrowest demographic on state
immigration legislation implementation
A. Percentage of
B. Change in percentage of
narrowest demographic
narrowest demographic
Population
Employment
Population
Employment
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
________________________________________________________________________
Coefficient
0.51
0.15
0.34
0.09
-0.24 -0.05
-0.22 -0.04
. .
(0.40) (0.10)
(0.44) (0.11)
(0.31) (0.08)
(0.34) (0.08)
95% bounds:
Lower
-0.27 -0.04
-0.53 -0.12
-0.85 -0.19
-0.89 0.20
Upper
1.28
0.33
1.21
0.29
0.37 0.10
0.45
0.12
Control
Region All
Region All
Region All
Region All
Notes: Each estimate is from an OLS regression with the dummy variable for omnibus immigration
legislation implementation as the dependent variable. Reported estimates have the following interpretation
for Panel A: a one unit increase in the percentage of the narrowest demographic in total state population
(employment) is associated with a 100%*coefficient increase in the probability of state immigration
legislation implementation. Reported estimates have the following interpretation for Panel B: a one unit
increase in the change in the percentage of the narrowest demographic in total state population (employment)
is associated with a 100%*coefficient increase in the probability of state immigration legislation
implementation.

Figure 1.1. Population before and after implementation: narrowest demographic
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Notes: Population is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US after
1982 in the total state population (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured during the one-year
implementation period, consisting of six months before and after the implementation date of state omnibus
immigration legislation. Implementation month-year combinations are indicated in the middle of the x-axis
of each panel.

Figure 1.2. Employment before and after implementation: narrowest demographic
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Notes: Employment is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US
after 1982 among the total employed in each state (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured during
the one-year implementation period, consisting of six months before and after the implementation date of
state omnibus immigration legislation. Implementation month-year combinations are indicated in the middle
of the x-axis of each panel.

Figure 1.3. Population at implementation: narrowest demographic
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Notes: Population is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US after
1982 in the total state population (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured one year before
implementation of omnibus immigration law for each state implementing legislation, as well as the
corresponding non-implementing states for each given implementation period.

Figure 1.4. Employment at implementation: narrowest demographic
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Notes: Employment is measured as the proportion of low-skilled, Hispanic immigrants arriving to the US
after 1982 among the total employed in each state (ages 20 to 60). Proportions displayed are measured one
year before implementation of omnibus immigration law for each state implementing legislation, as well as
the corresponding non-implementing states for each given implementation period.
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GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY AND THE PRO-TRADE EFFECT OF
MIGRATION: STATE-LEVEL EVIDENCE FROM MEXICAN MIGRANTS IN
THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
Recent studies emphasize the link between migration and trade, both through
theoretical models and empirical evidence. From the seminal works of Gould (1994) and
Head and Ries (1998) to more recent articles such as Aleksynska and Peri (2011), Kugler
and Rapoport (2011) and Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2011), all point to the same general
conclusion: migrants do indeed promote international trade between the destination and
origin countries. The robust positive relationship between human and goods mobility
across studies is especially noteworthy given the variety of approaches employed and the
number of countries studied. While most studies use a standard gravity model augmented
with a migration variable as well as various controls for bilateral trade costs, specific
methods vary, including pooled cross section or panel data OLS with fixed effects, 2SLS
and generalized propensity scores. The US and Canada garner the majority of attention in
terms of country-specific studies, focusing on migrants to the destination country and the
subsequent trade from the destination country to all other countries; however, studies have
also focused on the UK, Spain, Denmark and Bolivia, among others.19 Furthermore, the
geographic unit under examination varies, many measuring links at the country-country
level while others narrow the focus to state-country connections.20

19

For example, see Girma and Yu (2002), Peri and Requeña (2010), White (2007), and Erlich and Canavire
Bacarreza (2006), respectively.
20
In order to maintain consistency, I always refer to the geographic unit in terms of destination-origin. For
example, I classify a study examining the connection between migrants living in the United States and their
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As to the channels through which migrants enhance trade, the consensus points to
a preference channel normally associated with increased imports for the migrantdestination country, and an information channel associated with increased imports and
exports for the migrant-destination country. Migrants may bring preferences for specific
products with them to the destination region, leading to increased imports from the
corresponding origin regions; on the other hand, migrants familiar with language, tastes,
customs, or the workings of business and law in both the place of origin and destination
may pass this information on to firms, thereby lowering the cost associated with entering
or increasing presence in a particular foreign market, potentially increasing both imports
and exports.
Two natural questions arise from this consistent body of evidence on the pro-trade
effect of migration: (1) How localized are the preferences and information that migrants
embody and potentially transmit to firms? and (2) How does geographic proximity matter
for migration's pro-trade effect? While several previous studies focus on the state level for
the given destination country, to my knowledge no studies examine the migration-trade
link at the relatively localized state-state level, neither for one migration variable nor
considering classification by geographic proximity of migrants.
By employing the state-state level in the following analysis, this finer geographic
disaggregation allows for (1) more precise measurement of migrant networks and other
potential determinants of trade, including the distance and mass variables fundamental to
any gravity model, and (2) differentiation between different states of residence and origin

connection with exports from the U.S. (entire country) to countries of migrants' origins as “countrycountry.”
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for migrants and the associated trade. The former more accurately depicts the variation in
the covariates theorized to drive the migration-trade nexus, in turn permitting more precise
estimates.21 The latter crucially allows for the possibility that networks of migrants of
similar state origin matter for the pro-trade effect of migration, above and beyond the
traditionally-examined networks of compatriots. In other words, not only does a Mexican
migrant now provide different information to the potential U.S. export market than a
Canadian migrant, a Veracruzano (from the Gulf coast state of Veracruz, Mexico) also
provides different knowledge than a Jalicense (from the Pacific coast state of Jalisco,
Mexico).
As far as geographic proximity, Herander and Saavedra (2005) and Artal-Tur et al.
(2012) (hereafter HS and APR, respectively) both point to the importance of distance
between the networks of migrants that ultimately supply the pro-trade effect of migration
as a determinant of the extra associated trade. Further understanding the importance of
geographic proximity clearly sheds light on the influence of migrants, specifically as to
whether an increase in exports can be expected given an increase in migrants of a particular
state in states adjacent to the state under examination. While both previous studies show
that geographic proximity certainly matters (the pro-trade effect is stronger as distance
between migrant networks decreases), they lack the finer geographic disaggregation on the
side of migrant origin (export destination).
My approach examines empirically the migration-trade nexus at the state-state
level, first intentionally ignoring geographic proximity and then classifying migrants into

21

For example, Yilmazkuday (2013) finds that the estimated coefficient for distance in the gravity-type
models of determinants of international trade suffers from greater bias if not considering production
location within countries (at the state or local level).
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three categories based on distance between migrant networks. Using data linking migrants'
states of origin with current states of residence, I determine how localized the information
that migrants transmit to exporting firms actually is and how geographic proximity matters
in this process of transmission. Specifically, this method maps Mexican migrants' Mexican
state of origin to current state of residence in the United States, using data on matrícula
consular (consulate registration) holders available from the Mexican government.22 Use of
a standard gravity model augmented to include migration as an additional explanatory
variable for exports from U.S. to Mexican states, as well as an extension relying on the
generalized propensity scores (GPS) method, allow for estimation of the pro-trade effect
that migrants have at the state-state level for the first time, both overall and classified by
geographic proximity.
I find that just as in previous studies at the country-country and state-country levels,
migrants indeed have a statistically significant pro-trade effect at the state-state level,
promoting exports from U.S. states of residence to Mexican states of origin. The initial
specification reveals an elasticity of exports to migration of 0.11, while the GPS extension
signals a diminishing yet positive marginal contribution over nearly the entire range of
actual measured migrant stocks. Classified by geographic proximity, the preferred
specification reveals the expected partial pro-trade effects otherwise disguised by the single
estimate of migration's pro-trade effect, corresponding to contributions of $1984 (in-state)
and $538 (neighboring-state) to annual exports between respective U.S. and Mexican states

22

The matrícula consular is an identification card made available by the Mexican government to citizens
residing abroad starting in 1871. The card must be renewed every five years, giving the holder access to
opening a bank account, obtaining a driver's license, and other services, depending on the specific country
and state of residence. I define state of origin as the last state of permanent residence before migration
occurred from Mexico to the U.S..
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associated with each average additional migrant. Given these results, geographic proximity
appears to matter just as in HS and APR, with the in-state effect surpassing the neighboringstate effect in magnitude; however, in contrast with previous results, I find that the
neighboring-state contribution of migrants is indeed of statistical significance. All results
vary minimally in magnitude and significance across several checks for robustness,
providing clear evidence as to the additional benefit of migration that manifests itself
through its nexus with international trade, highlighted at the relatively localized state-state
level for the first time and classified by geographic proximity of migrant networks.
The rest of this chapter continues with a discussion of several aspects unique to the
U.S.-Mexico relationship with relevance to the migration-trade nexus. I highlight my initial
empirical strategy and data sources, followed by a discussion of the main results. After
various checks for robustness and the details on the GPS extension, I briefly conclude.
US-Mexico relationship
The U.S.-Mexico relationship provides an especially interesting and appropriate
setting conducive to examining the pro-trade effect of migration for several reasons. First
and foremost is the fact that data is actually available, permitting the analysis at the statestate level for the first time. Detailed exports data from U.S. to Mexican states are available
for all years since 1994, coinciding with the implementation of the North American Free
Trade Agreement. Perhaps most noteworthy is the availability of the matrícula consular
data, uniquely allowing for the connection of Mexican state of origin to U.S. state of
residence for each migrant registered during the period examined.
Additionally, as both the U.S. and Mexico are relatively large, heterogeneous
countries, separation by state origin and destination is theoretically worthwhile; there is
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clearly wide differentiation within countries as to preferences and the knowledge and
information that residents hold about markets, customs, and tastes, all important factors for
the theorized channels through which the pro-trade effect operates. For example, an
emigrant leaving the southeastern state of Chiapas to reside in a given U.S. state
undoubtedly has much different information than an emigrant leaving the northern state of
Sonora, arguably similar to the level of differentiation existing across migrants of varying
nationalities signaled by the previous literature.
Although this differentiation, depending on Mexican state of origin and U.S. state
of residence, points unequivocally to the theorized pro-trade effect of migration at the statestate level, several aspects of the U.S.-Mexico relationship signal that this effect could
potentially be minimized relative to the entire range of possible pro-trade effects across all
countries (and the respective sub-national divisions). First, both trade and migration
between the U.S. and Mexico are relatively well-established, neither phenomenon being
particularly new in its existence. HS, among others, find that the existence of a previous
large migrant stock reduces any pro-trade effect of new migrants. However, the “newness”
of migration from and to particular Mexican and U.S. states, respectively, could potentially
offset the fact that the Mexico-U.S. migration is not novel at the country-country level.23
Second, Mexican migration levels to the U.S. are relatively high, especially relevant if
beyond a certain level of migration, further migrants may not marginally stimulate trade
between places of residence and origin. The mean state-state count of matrículas

23

Card and Lewis (2007) examines the choice of U.S. states of destination for Mexican migrants, analyzing
changing trends during the 1990s. Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2011) also highlights the importance of
new migrants in updating information.
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consulares for my sample is 3038, with the maximum of 270,201 corresponding to those
Michoacanos registered in California. Previous evidence is divided on the existence of an
“exhaustion point” of the pro-trade effect of migration, one of the possibilities explored in
the GPS extension of Section 6; Serrano and Requeña (2013, hereafter SR) finds that every
migrant makes a positive marginal contribution to exports at the province-country level,
while Egger et al. (2012, hereafter EVN) finds evidence of an exhaustion point for imports
at the country-country level of approximately 4,000 migrants, above which additional
migrants provide zero stimulus for imports. Finally, a majority of the Mexican migrant
population in the U.S. is relatively low-skilled and may not participate in any form of
business network. These general characteristics are of potential importance given recent
findings that being high-skilled and having access to business networks makes migrants
particularly effective in their promotion of trade.24
Given the outlined aspects of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, any pro-trade effect
found at the state-state level between states of these neighbor countries can be hypothesized
to fall at the lower end of the spectrum of potential worldwide effects across all countries.
In turn, while any claims of external validity should clearly be met with due skepticism,
the presence of a U.S.-Mexico link between migration and trade would appear to suggest
an even stronger potential of the general existence of a pro-trade effect of migration at the
state-state level.
Empirical Strategy and Data

24

See Felbermayr and Jung (2009) and Aleksynska and Peri (2011) for these respective emphases.
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In estimating the effect of migration on international trade between states in the
United States and in Mexico, I first employ a standard gravity model, the most common
empirical strategy for studies examining not only factors affecting trade, but also the
potential pro-trade stimulus provided by migration. Putting aside geographic proximity for
a moment, I start with the standard model augmented with migration between respective
state pairs as an additional explanatory variable; the resulting specification serves as a
useful benchmark for the analysis to follow.

Incorporating the potential importance of geographic proximity, I then further
augment the gravity model to include two additional measures of Mexican migration to the
United States.

The variable

measures exports from U.S. state to Mexican state in terms of

yearly total value, dependent on migration, size of market (income), distance, and
adjacency.

captures the stock of matrícula consular holders in each U.S. state from

each Mexican state of origin ,

measures the stock of matrícula consular holders

in the states adjacent to each U.S. state from each Mexican state of origin , while
reflects the stock of matrícula consular holders in the rest of U.S. states (exclusive of state
and adjacent states) from each Mexican state of origin ;
products of U.S. state and Mexican state , respectively,
land from U.S. state capital to Mexican state capital, while
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and

are the gross state

represents the distance by
is a dummy variable

taking the value of 1 for adjacent states and that of 0 for states not sharing a border. Given
the log transformations, the coefficients of interest,

,

, and

thus pinpoint the

percentage increase (decrease) in yearly exports flowing from a U.S. state to a Mexican
state associated with a 1% increase in the stock of migrants originating from the
corresponding Mexican state and registered in the corresponding U.S. state (i.e., in-state),
in the neighbors of the corresponding U.S. state (i.e., neighboring-state), and in the
remainder of all other U.S. states (i.e., other-state), respectively. Additionally,
and

,

,

,

are U.S. and Mexican state fixed effects, controlling for the multilateral resistance

terms as recommended by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). Other variables commonly
employed as controls for bilateral trade costs in previous migration-augmented gravity
models, such as trade agreements, language, colonial ties, legal system, currency, and
cultural distance, are not relevant in the current setting since these variables are generally
not differentiated within a single country, this being true in the case of the United States
and Mexico.25 If migration indeed is conducive to trade, an expectation of
0, and

0,

0,

0 holds, the latter two inequalities depending on how far-reaching

migrant networks' influence is; if geographic proximity matters for the migration-trade
nexus, the clear expectation is

.

Before detailing the data, the use of migrant stocks as the measure of migration
merits a brief discussion. While much of the literature relies on migrant flows and
subsequent panel data, I follow Felbermayr and Toubal (2007) and Vézina (2012) in the

25

There is a limited amount of heterogeneity for these potential variables, for example with the presence of
a number of languages in Mexico, however in the sample at hand this differentiation is so minimal that it
does not justify inclusion in the regression equation as an additional control variable.
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use of stocks and the resulting cross-sectional data; several reasons exist pointing to
migrant stocks as the appropriate choice for measuring migration when examining the
migration-trade nexus.26 First, the hypothesized information channel operates with an
indeterminate amount of lag; it is apparent that some time is needed for migrants to transmit
information to exporting firms, however the exact amount of time is unclear, leaving the
pinpointing of the appropriate lag for a panel estimation next to impossible. Second, any
potential yearly data noise is minimized by employing migration stocks rather than flows.
Finally, one may argue that migrant flows capture the most relevant information for the
migration-trade link, as each year's migrants hold the most updated information
corresponding to the associated year's exports. However, given that my migrant stock is
the accumulation of those migrants registering for the matrícula consular between 2006
and 2010, any worries of the embodied information being outdated are easily dispelled, as
it is difficult to imagine this type of information rendered useless in the passage of a
maximum of only five years. In fact, stocks appropriately capture the notion that exporting
firms likely build on existing information accumulated from migrants over the years (even
if the information is updated gradually) and that trade relationships may persist even if
there is yearly variation in migration flows (Vézina, 2012).
Values of state-state exports are obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Transportation
statistics; these statistics cover all exports from the U.S. to Mexico at the state-state level,
except for those transported by air or water, providing 90% coverage of total exports

26

I discuss below how the use of cross-sectional data limits direct treatment of the questions of potential
endogeneity and direction of causality in the migration-trade context.
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between the two nations.27 Given this coverage, the non-contiguous U.S. states of Alaska
and Hawaii are excluded from the analysis.28 For the preferred specification, trade is
measured by the state-state values from the year 2010. As original export data are listed
with current dollars as the unit, I use the U.S. CPI-U series to convert all values to 2011
U.S. dollars. Statistics on the number of matrículas consulares issued are calculated given
the information provided by the Insitituto de los Mexicanos en el Exterior (IME). Since
holders of the card must specify last state of Mexican residence as well as current state of
U.S. residence during the application process, these statistics uniquely allow for the
construction of the necessary state-state migration data. As the identification cards have a
renewal period of five years, I sum the available data from 2006 to 2010 in constructing
the stock of Mexican migrants for each state-state combination.29 I consult the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Estadística y
Geografía (INEGI) statistics for the respective gross state products corresponding to 2010,
while distance between capital cities is calculated using the shortest route by land expressed
in number of miles.30 The original data for Mexican gross state products are listed with the
unit of 2003 pesos, therefore I initially convert the values to 2003 U.S. dollars using the

27

While imports data would clearly provide for useful comparison, unfortunately state-state data is not
presently available.

28

Modifications to the trade value calculation used to check for sensitivity of the results to these changes
are detailed below.

29

As of final revisions, data from 2010 is the most recent available.

30

This differs from the standard measure used by similar studies, that of great circle distance, due to the
fact that the trade data (and a majority of Mexico-U.S. migration) is by land. However, if great circle
distance is indeed employed as the measure of distance, results change only minimally, with a slight
increase in the magnitude of the distance coefficient.
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average of monthly historical peso-dollar exchange rates from 2003. Finally, just as with
the U.S. gross state products originally reported with the unit of 2005 U.S. dollars, I again
use the CPI-U series to convert all values to 2011 dollars in order to maintain uniformity
with the export values.
As the matrícula consular data do not completely cover the population of Mexican
origin in the U.S. and could possibly present problems of selection, I closely examine the
distribution of Mexican migrants across the U.S. states of residence in attempting to
determine whether these data sufficiently represent the actual distribution of residents of
Mexican origin across the U.S. states. As there is no justifiable reason to expect that
Mexican state of origin affects selection into obtaining a matrícula consular,31 if the
distribution of the data is sufficiently close to the actual distribution of Mexican migrants
(irrespective of Mexican state origin) across U.S. states, the use of the matrícula consular
data can be said to provide a certain level of representativeness for the state-state
distribution, thereby minimizing any bias arising from selection problems. I thus can use
the 2010 U.S. Census as a benchmark for comparison; I contrast the matrícula consular
data with that of the Census, in which the number of residents in each U.S. state claiming
Mexican origin is detailed.
Figure 2.1 details the distribution of Mexican migrants in the U.S. for both the
matrícula consular data and the Census data; the data are expressed as the number of
Mexican migrants in each state divided by the total stock of migrants from each respective

31

A natural assumption may be that education level is associated with legal migration status, thereby
making it more likely for individuals to obtain a matrícula consular if the state of origin corresponds to a
low-education Mexican state on average. However, this assumption does not appear to be correct; see
below for a related brief discussion.
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source.32 In fact, the matrícula consular data performs well in representing the actual
distribution of Mexican migrants across U.S. states, with most states' difference
coordinates close to zero. Only two states, Texas and Illinois, suffer from differences
greater than 3%, while 43 of 48 states' differences in percentages are less than 1%.
Additionally, one may expect that the number of highly-educated migrants is
underrepresented in the matrícula consular data, because of the fact that there is no clear
incentive for a documented U.S. resident to hold the identification card. The consideration
is especially important given the previously mentioned studies emphasizing the extra
relevance of highly-educated migrants in promoting trade above and beyond the average
migrant contribution. Taking the average education level in Mexican states from INEGI
statistics, dispersed over a range of 6.7 to 10.5 years of schooling with a mean of 8.6, a first
check of the data indeed shows a negative correlation between Mexican state average
education level and the percentage of origin state population registered with the matrícula
consular.33
However, the correlation gives no information as to the key question of how
education level actually relates to legal migration status, and in turn to the matrícula
consular. It is not clear that the expectation of underrepresentation is reasonable, given that
the correlation between legal migration status and education level is anything but definitive
for Mexican migrants in the U.S. Passel and Cohn (2009) determines that 47% of
unauthorized migrants ages 25 to 64 in the U.S. have completed high school or less, while

32

This fraction with an upper limit of 1 is then multiplied by 100, resulting in the numbers expressed on the
y-axis of Figure 1.

33

See Figure 2.2 for a scatter plot of this correlated data.
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Caponi and Plesca (2012) argues that documented Mexican migrants in the U.S. are
actually more likely to have a lower education level than undocumented migrants.
Comparing the matrícula consular data with other representative data as to education level
presents two problems. The IME only reports state-state statistics including education level
for 2006 and 2007, thereby providing a smaller sample in representing the overall stock of
migrants; in addition, the best data for comparison, that of the U.S. Current Population
Survey, is known to undercount undocumented migrants. Because of these difficulties and
lack of available data, I do not empirically address the issue of state-state distribution by
education level. Additional data availability would clearly allow for future exploration of
this further rich level of detail.
Table A.1 details the number of matrículas consulares registered from 2006 to
2010, classified by both US state of residence and Mexican state of origin, while Table A.2
focuses on the state-state makeup of Mexican migration to the three top U.S. destination
states, California, Texas, and Illinois, and the corresponding exports to Mexico. Table A.2
and Figure A.1 provide an initial idea of the simple correlation between state-state
migration and exports. Without any controls for bilateral trade costs or state fixed effects,
the best-fit line displayed in Figure A.1 exhibits a slope of 0.44, providing preliminary
evidence of a potential positive relationship between migration and exports at the statestate level. Table 2.1 shows the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum for
variables in both the base and alternative samples.

Results and Discussion
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Column 1 of Table 2.2 displays the results of the OLS regression employing the
benchmark gravity equation. Including Mexico City, the base sample consists of 1536
observations, a result of all trading pairs of 48 U.S. and 32 Mexican states. The coefficient
estimate of migrants' effect on state-state exports is indeed significantly positive; holding
all other factors constant, an increase of 1% in the number of state-state migrants is
associated with a 0.11% increase in state-state exports, with

0.01. Distance, as

expected, is significantly negative, reflecting a 1.60% decrease in state-state exports
associated with a 1% increase in distance between the respective capitals of U.S. and
Mexican states. Holding other factors constant, states that are adjacent enjoy more than
double the trade of nonadjacent states, while a 1% increase in combined economy size is
associated with a 0.94% increase in state-state exports. All coefficient estimates have the
expected positive (negative) relationship with state-state exports, and are highly
significant.
While these initial results are the first to confirm the existence of the pro-trade effect
of migration at the more localized state-state level, given the crucial findings of HS and
APR and the main hypothesis of this paper, it is not surprising that Columns 2 to 5 unmask
key complexities disguised by the estimates in Column 1. Focusing on the preferred
specification in Column 5, the geographic proximity of migrants clearly appears to matter
for the promotion of international trade. The coefficients of both in-state and neighboringstate migration are statistically significant, remaining so even after adding all relevant
control variables. As expected, the elasticity with respect to in-state migration at 0.07 is
lower than that of Column 1, due to the addition of neighboring-state migration. An
increase of 1% in neighboring-state migration is associated with a 0.08% increase in state-
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state exports, while increased migration in the rest of U.S. states is associated with a small,
yet statistically insignificant negative effect on state-state exports. The remaining
independent variables' coefficients and levels of significance are similar to those of Column
1, with attenuation in magnitude only for the distance estimate. Interpreting the coefficients
of interest, Column 1 appears to capture the overall pro-trade effect of migration, masking
the actual importance of geographic proximity. Column 5 sheds light on this importance;
in-state migration indeed promotes trade between U.S. states of residence and Mexican
states of origin, however neighboring-state migration also has an essential role in this
expansion of trade.
The OLS estimates in turn permit a simple calculation of the magnitude of the protrade effect of migration, highlighting the quantitative importance of this effect, as well as
allowing for a comparison of the relative sizes of the benefit from in-state, neighboringstate, and other-state migration. This exercise carries extra importance given the fact that
at first glance the estimates in Column 5 appear to point to a counterintuitive result, that
in-state migration is associated with a smaller pro-trade effect than that of neighboringstate migration. Starting with results from Column 1, given a 10% increase in average
immigration from a particular Mexican state to a particular U.S. state, the average migrant
stock increases from 3038 to 3342. Employing the estimated coefficient of approximately
0.11, this 10% increase in migration results in an increase in average state-state exports,
settling on the new value of exports equal to $82,923,424. This translates into $3061 extra
state-state exports per year associated with the average extra migrant.34

34

This figure can be alternatively calculated by multiplying the elasticity of exports to migration by the
ratio of average state-state exports to average migrant stock.
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When different geographic proximities are separated in Column 5, I can now break
down the distinct components of the pro-trade effect of migration. Once again assuming a
10% increase in average in-state migration, the average in-state migrant stock increases
3038 to 3342. Using the estimated coefficient of approximately 0.07 results in an increase
in average state-state exports of $602,653, translating into $1984 extra state-state exports
per year associated with the average extra in-state migrant. At the same time, these extra
304 migrants are neighboring-state migrants for an average of 4.39 states (the average
number of adjacent states for all U.S. states). Given the average neighboring-state migrant
stock of 12,409, this increase is equivalent to a 2.45% increase. In turn, relying on the
percentage increase and the estimate from Column 5 of approximately 0.08, average statestate exports increase by $538 per neighboring-state migrant. Finally, the extra 304
migrants are equivalent to a 0.23% increase in migration in the rest of the average of 42.61
states. Given the Column 5 estimate of approximately -0.02, this increase results in a
decrease of $13 per average migrant.35 Finally, collecting all calculations of separate
components in order to compile an overall effect results in $3792 of extra state-state
exports associated with the average extra immigrant from Mexico residing in the U.S.; it
is crucial to emphasize that this contribution to exports by the single average extra migrant
is actually spread across U.S. states, the three terms of Footnote 18 corresponding to state
, neighbors of state , and the rest of U.S. states, respectively.36 The compiled result is
similar in magnitude to that of Column 1, however the separation of distinct geographic
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Trade diversion could be a simple explanation for this negative effect, however I intentionally do not
explore this further given the small magnitude and lack of significance of the
estimate.

36

The calculation is as follows: $1984+$538(4.39)-$13(42.61).

62

proximities allows for the differentiation between the relatively larger in-state contribution
of the average extra immigrant, the smaller neighboring-state contribution, and the
minuscule other-state reduction of state-state exports.
In comparing the estimates and magnitude of the pro-trade effect of migration to
those of the literature, I rely on HS and APR, as well as previous state-country and countrycountry studies, as this paper is the first to examine the state-state level. While doing so
provides a framework within which viewing my results is feasible, given the novel statestate level and the emphasis on distinct geographic proximities, any comparison must be
accompanied by a disclaimer highlighting these differences in sampling and geographic
disaggregation of data. Table 2.3 provides an update of Table 2.1 from Peri and Requeña
(2010) in order to include estimates from more recent studies, and those of this paper, as
well as a comparison of extra annual exports generated per extra migrant. The elasticity of
exports to in-state migration estimated as 0.07 echoes the positive, significant estimates
from both HS and APR, however my significantly positive estimate for neighboring-state
migration contrasts with that of HS (positive, but insignificant) and APR (not significantly
different from zero).
Additionally, the finding of $3792 extra yearly exports generated by each extra
migrant is similar to those of $2608 and $2717, detailed in White (2007) and Felbermayr
and Jung (2009), respectively. While these estimates differ most dramatically from that of
$24,895 found by Aleksynska and Peri (2011), it is worthwhile to signal that these numbers
are not necessarily incompatible. As Aleksynska and Peri (2011) points out, factors such
as average number of migrants in the sample and the specific measure of migrant stock
contribute to these differentiated estimates. My measure based on the matrícula consular
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includes some migrants who may not be economically active, and does not classify
migrants based on education level, which most likely further attenuates estimates as
mentioned in Kugler and Rapoport (2011).
Robustness and Sensitivity Checks
Among concerns of econometrics, it would be ideal to establish the direction of
causality given the potential issue of endogeneity. While migrants contribute to trade
through the aforementioned channels, there is also the possibility that trade could
encourage migration, especially if increased trade is associated with higher incomes that
act to attract migrants. However, as pointed out in Felbermayr and Toubal (2012), income
and therefore cross-country (state) wage differentials may be affected by aggregate trade,
but it is not clear how bilateral trade affects these wage differentials. While I am unable to
test for the direction of causality given the cross-sectional data that I employ, I rely on the
established literature that has gone to great lengths in demonstrating that rather than trade
encouraging migration, migration actually encourages trade. Furthermore, given that my
data is at the state-state level, a central concern as to validity expressed in Hanson (2010)
is dispelled. Specifically, the state-state data eliminates the concern of omitted variables
related to bilateral economic policies driving both international trade and migration since
these very economic policies are generally set at the national level, not exhibiting variation
within countries.
As a first check for robustness of the obtained results, I outline a new set of
estimates in Table 2.4, now excluding Mexico City from the sample given the fact that it
is not clear whether Mexico City should be included as a 32nd Mexican “state;” the revised
sample contains 1488 state-state observations. The magnitude and significance of the pro-
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trade effect of migration change minimally, the exclusion of Mexico City slightly
decreasing the magnitude of the in-state coefficient to just under 0.07 and that of
neighboring states to nearly 0.08. An additional concern arises from the comparison of the
matrícula consular data and the U.S. Census data highlighted in Section 3. Although a high
level of representativeness is present, Texas and Illinois clearly are outliers in this respect,
reflecting a difference of 9.11% and 3.24% between the data sets, respectively. Especially
given the fact that both Texas and Illinois are two of the main destination states in the U.S.
for Mexican migrants, it is important to consider migration's pro-trade effect excluding the
two outliers from the sample as an additional test of robustness. Table 2.4 also highlights
the coefficient estimates generated excluding Texas and Illinois, using a sample of 1472
observations resulting from the combination of 46 U.S. and 32 Mexican states. Compared
to the results presented in Table 2.2, in-state migration's effect on state-state exports is
slightly greater, while neighboring-state migration's estimate is slightly lower, both
minimally less significant.
Selection of state-state exports from the year 2010 as the measure for the dependent
variable could be driving the obtained results; if estimates of migration's pro-trade effect
on trade differ greatly across the use of varied individual years of trade data as alternative
dependent variables, this would clearly be cause for concern. However, the estimates in
fact vary only minimally when using exports data from 2008 and 2009 in lieu of 2010, as
reported in Table 2.5. Migration's pro-trade effect remains significant and similar in
magnitude across all alternative regressions accounted for, with the in-state estimate
bottoming out at 0.0731 and peaking at 0.0935. Using the same simple method of
calculation as in the previous section, these figures correspond to an extra $1819 and $2053
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of annual exports, respectively, associated with the average extra in-state migrant, not
considering the neighboring- and other-state contributions.
An additional concern is that trade and migration could be determined jointly,
leaving forwarding the measure of exports as a clear strategy to alleviate this potential
problem.37 I regress exports for periods

1,

2, and

3, respectively, with the

preferred sample and specification, using all possible corresponding measures of migrant
stock (matrícula consular stock) to eliminate any possibility of joint determination. This
strategy results in six further regressions; Table 2.6 reports estimation results along with
the corresponding exports and migration measures employed in each additional regression.
The estimation of migration's pro-trade effect is consistent across these varied measures,
both in magnitude and significance, with the elasticity of state-state exports to in-state
migration ranging from 0.0789 to 0.1013.
Finally, I check the consistency of the estimates reported in Column 1 of Table 2.2
given an alternative measure of migration. Specifically, I now use the share of all Mexican
migrants residing in U.S. state

who originate from Mexican state

as the proxy for

migration rather than migrant stocks. As outlined in Rauch and Trindade (2002) and echoed
in Parsons and Vézina (2013), in the context of U.S.-Mexico state-state trade, a higher level
of Mexican migrants from state

in U.S. state

increases the number of potential

connections between exporting firms from U.S. state

and state

Mexican consumers

while a higher migrant share increases the probability of a U.S. state

exporting firm

sending products to the associated Mexican state . Table 7 highlights the estimated
37

As Aleksynska and Peri (2011) mentions, since the migration measure is a stock accumulated over years,
it is probable that it is determined before trade flows; however I forward exports to assure that joint
determination is not a factor.
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coefficients given the use of the alternative measure, clearly confirming the significant
positive association of migration with trade across the varied samples.
Extension: An Application of Generalized Propensity Scores
The evidence from EVN and SR points to the existence of nonlinearities in the
migration-trade relationship, EVN finding an exhaustion point beyond which further
migration no longer makes a positive marginal contribution to international trade. In the
extension of the initial OLS examination, I apply generalized propensity scores to a
continuous treatment (migrant stock levels), flexibly permitting the existence of
nonlinearities. The GPS estimation provides the advantage of describing the pro-trade
effect in detail over the entire spectrum of observed migrant stocks as the resulting
estimated dose-response function reflects the expected outcome (exports) associated with
each and every observed treatment (migrant stocks) under examination, not just the general
elasticity of exports to migration. The use of this methodology is particularly attractive
given the importance of addressing three central questions of interest in the migration-trade
link: (1) is there a minimum level of migration required to generate positive returns
(measured in terms of marginal exports), (2) is there a level of migration corresponding to
a saturation point, beyond which positive marginal exports are completely exhausted, and
(3) is there a certain migrant stock size that maximizes the pro-trade effect of migration.
Method
As the GPS uses the comparison of those observations demonstrating a certain level
of homogeneity across observable characteristics, the method permits correction of the
potential bias caused by selection into varying levels of treatment intensity, also allowing
for the estimation of the trade outcomes associated with each of these different levels of
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treatment intensity. Propensity score methods have been applied to binary treatments
(Heckman et al., 1997), multiple treatments (Imbens, 2000), and most recently, continuous
treatments (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). As I consider differing levels of state-state migrant
stocks as widely varying doses across the spectrum of a continuous treatment in a quasiexperimental setting, I rely on the methodology outlined in the latter of the propensity score
applications.
Observing treatment doses
outcome variable

, the vector of observable covariates

, and the

associated with the received treatment for all state-state pairs

1, … , , the goal of GPS estimation is ultimately pinpointing the dose-response
function,

, interpreted as the average outcome associated with the specific

treatment intensity . This clearly highlights one advantage of GPS estimation; it allows
for the estimation of the average outcome associated with each and every observed
treatment intensity of the independent variable of focus.
The central assumption from Hirano and Imbens (2004) is that of weak
| for all ∈ , i.e., for

unconfoundedness for continuous treatments, defined as

all possible realizations of treatment intensity, the outcome variable must reflect
conditional independence. Therefore, any difference in treatment intensities is independent
of the corresponding outcomes, after controlling for the observable covariates . Assuming
,
,

to be the conditional density of the treatment given the set of covariates, i.e.,
|

| , the GPS is in turn defined as

,

.

Just as in other applications of the propensity score, the GPS is characterized by a
balancing property in which the probability that

within strata of the GPS is

independent of the set of covariates . In turn, removing potential bias requires two steps:
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first, the estimation of the conditional expectation of the outcome given the treatment and
the GPS,

,

|

,

; second, the estimation of the dose-response

function as the average of the conditional expectation over the GPS at a particular treatment
intensity,38

,

,

.

Estimation of the effect of migration on exports
After logarithmic transformation, the treatment variable of state-state migrant
stocks is approximately normal, with skewness of -0.14 and kurtosis of 2.52, so I assume
a normal distribution in estimating the conditional distribution of migration given the
vector of chosen covariates:

| ~

,

.

is a column vector, while

is

a row vector consisting of a variety of observable push and pull determinants of treatment
intensity. Population and gross state product (GSP) enter

as logarithmic transformations,

as squares of those logarithmic transformations, and as growth variables for both Mexican
states of origin and U.S. states of destination, intentionally allowing for a flexible, nonlinear relationship between these measures of market size and migrant stocks.39
Furthermore, I include the standard geographic variables of adjacency and distance as
covariates; the former as a binary variable taking the value of 1 for adjacent state-state pairs
and 0 for non-adjacent state-state pairs, and the latter as a logarithmic transformation of the
distance in miles by land from the respective Mexican state capital to the respective U.S.

38

See Hirano and Imbens (2004) for the proof that these two steps actually remove bias.

39

In other specifications, I also included cubic terms of both population and GSP for Mexican and U.S.
states, however, while explanatory power
increased slightly, none of the additional coefficients
exhibited high statistical significance. Estimated coefficients did not change in any significant way
compared to those reported.
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state capital.40 In addition, I insert unemployment rates and Gini coefficients for both
Mexican states of origin and U.S. states of destination into the

vector, controlling for

scarcity of employment availability and income inequality, respectively.41 Both measures
are frequently included as push and pull factors in the determinants of migration (Clark et
al., 2007; Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Mayda, 2010). I estimate the equation using scaled
ordinary least squares, highlighting the results in Table 2.8.42
In general, the selected covariates are highly statistically significant, all
independent variables being significant at the 2% level or lower except for the first- and
second-order “Mex. GSP” variables and “Adjacency;” furthermore, the majority of the
variation in treatment intensity (size of migrant stocks) is indeed explained by the
covariates making up the vector

, the

signaling this portion as 76%.

With the OLS estimation in hand, I construct the GPS as:
.

√

After generating the propensity scores, the balancing property must be tested in
order to verify that the GPS indeed improves the balance of covariates, thereby providing
confirmation of the first step necessary for bias removal. I follow the group and block
method suggested by Hirano and Imbens (2004) in carrying out the balance check.

40

This differs from the standard circle distance used by much of the gravity literature, however I choose
this measure given that the trade data captures only trade by land and a majority of Mexico-U.S. migration
is by land, as well.

41

I take U.S. population data, U.S. unemployment rates, and U.S. Gini coefficients from the BEA, Census
Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics, respectively; data for Mexican states come from the INEGI.

42

Both exports and migration are expressed as logarithms of the respective variable plus one. Results are
equivalent to those obtained by maximum likelihood estimation, the method suggested for this initial
estimation in Bia and Mattie (2008).
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First, dividing the observations into four treatment intensity groups allows for the
comparison of covariates across these quartiles of the migrant stock distribution before
balancing on the GPS. The four groups of treatment intensity contain 373, 371, 372 and
372 state-state observations, respectively.43 As no GPS adjustment has yet occurred, the
left section of Table 2.10 clearly reflects the great disparities across groups in the covariates
of vector

, showing an average t-statistic of 5.46 and 66% of observable covariate

comparisons across treatment intensity groups being statistically different at the 5% level.
If left alone, these disparities lead to obvious concerns of biased inference due to selection
into treatment intensity groups determined by observable characteristics.
Second, dividing the observations into blocks or strata according to the GPS allows
for comparison of covariates across the treatment intensity quartiles, but now balanced on
the GPS. I evaluate the GPS for all observations
the median level of treatment intensity

1, … ,

using the OLS estimates at

for each of the four quartiles ∈ 1,2,3,4 , then

dividing the propensity scores into ten blocks based on the resulting GPS estimate deciles
for each of the four corresponding

. Just as before adjustment, I carry out two-tailed t-

tests in order to measure the balance of covariates present comparing across groups,
weighting the t-statistics by the respective number of observations in each block. However,
having blocked on the GPS estimates allows me to now compare observations that have
similar observable characteristics and hence the same predicted treatment intensity (same
GPS block), but also have differing levels of actual treatment intensity (different migrant

43

The Appendix details robustness checks using the GPS method with two alternative samples.
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stock quartiles).44 The middle section of Table 2.11 highlights the vast improvement in
balancing the covariates achieved by employing the GPS; 79% of all covariate comparisons
across treatment intensity groups exhibit no statistical differences at the 5% level, with
average t-statistics displayed of 1.22.
Some studies employing propensity score estimation additionally rely on the
common support condition in order to improve comparability of observations. The use of
the common support simply results in the exclusion of any observations in the given sample
that do not demonstrate a certain level of similarity in the observable covariates. Given the
group and block method, this translates into comparing the GPS calculations for
,

with those of

,

, where

∈ and ∈ . In turn, the only observations

used in the remainder of the estimation process are those observations where:
,

,

,

for all ∈ 1,2,3,4 .

A potential dilemma arises as only 390 of the 1488 state-state observations in fact
meet the common support condition stated above. Faced with this large loss of information,
a decision must be made among three standard solutions: (1) estimate the outcome variable
only within the common support, thereby maximizing the reduction in bias, but also
reducing the range over which exports can be predicted given the observed migration
levels; (2) estimate the outcome variable inside and outside the common support, thereby
maximizing the reduction in bias, maximizing the range over which exports can be
predicted given the observed migration levels, but also reducing the preciseness of the
estimated outcomes; or (3) estimate the outcome variable with all available observations,

44

The group and block method is highlighted in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, for the entire sample and for the
modified common support, respectively.
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thereby accepting a non-maximized reduction in potential bias, maximizing the range over
which exports can be predicted given the observed migration levels, and maximizing the
preciseness of the estimated outcomes. As exhibited in Table 11, much of the potential bias
is indeed reduced simply by balancing on the GPS, without any consideration for the
common support; 79% of all covariate comparisons across treatment intensity groups
exhibit no statistical differences at the 5% level. On the other hand, using only the common
support observations would greatly reduce the range of observed migrant stocks from 0227,032 (all observations) to 2-5,878 (common support observations), corresponding to a
dramatic reduction in means and medians of migrant stocks from 2406 to 347 and 210.5 to
134, respectively. Further evidence as to why the common support condition may be too
stringent for our purposes is provided by the simple comparison of covariate means
between those state-state combinations inside and outside the common support region.
Table 2.12 highlights these comparisons, and perhaps surprisingly, the two groups do not
appear to differ dramatically in the means of the covariates.
This fact points to the observation that exclusion from the common support region
is mostly attributed to a lack of similarity of generalized propensity scores corresponding
to just one of the four median treatment GPS group calculations, not a general lack of
comparability of observables for the excluded observations across all four median
treatment GPS groups. As the common support equation above highlights, the condition
for inclusion in the common support region indeed depends on overlap of the GPS in each
and every group , therefore if any state-state observation has even only one exception to
this rule, it is automatically excluded by the common support condition. Given the
combination of the evidence mentioned, there is no clear best option of the three standard
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solutions, although accepting the trade-off of a non-maximized reduction in bias in
exchange for a maximized amount of information, range over which exports can be
predicted, and preciseness in estimation may be the most attractive.
However, following Lechner (2008) in exploring alternative solutions to the
common support problem, I continue the estimation process by pursuing a fourth option,
one that I argue permits researchers confronted with similar common support dilemmas a
certain amount of flexibility that is extremely useful in modifying the common support
condition according to the particular needs of the research undertaken. By slightly relaxing
the stringent condition requiring presence of observations in the common support region
for all four groups , we can still assure a maximized reduction of bias, while not trading
off as much coverage and preciseness in terms of estimated outcomes. If indeed the
standard common support condition means the researcher must sacrifice a large portion of
information as in this paper, this condition relaxation provides a second-best option that
can be applied to the data. My modified common support rule simply relaxes equation the
equation above, now proposing that the only observations used in the remainder of the
estimation process are those observations where:
,

,

,

for at least two ∈ 1,2,3,4 .

That is, state-state observations are included as long as the corresponding GPS
median-treatment scores for at least two of the four treatment quartiles fall within the
common support region of the particular quartile. Guaranteeing a high level of
comparability, while relaxing the condition from the original common support equation
results in a new sample that does not suffer from the great loss of information previously
seen; only 59 state-state observations are excluded by the modified common support,
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resulting in the preferred sample of 1429 observations, and the range of migrant stocks
over which exports can be estimated is not reduced at all.45 Additionally, the balancing of
covariates is greatly improved through the use of the modified common support condition.
The right section of Table 2.11 highlights this dramatic improvement; 71 of 72 covariate
comparison groups show no statistical differences at the 5% level, with an average tstatistic of 0.71. In turn, the high level of comparability of observations vindicates the use
of the modified common support for this data set, as the guarantee of comparability of
observations and the resulting reduction in bias is the very reason for adhering to a common
support condition in the first place.
Moving on with only those observations meeting the modified common support
condition, as a first step in estimating the dose-response function, I estimate the conditional
expectation of exports given treatment intensity and the corresponding GPS:
| ,

.

values are the actual observed migrant stocks, while

values are those estimates

calculated from above. The resulting OLS estimates in Table 2.13 have no direct economic
interpretation (Hirano and Imbens, 2004), however the individual and joint statistical

The Appendix lists the 59 state-state observations excluded from the
1488 sample, as well as those
observations excluded from the
1536 and
1426 samples. It is important to point out that the
selection of at least two s and four treatment quartiles is the result of trying several variations of the
modified common support condition; however, rather than being a drawback of the approach, this actually
provides the researcher with the advantage of flexibility while assuring comparability of observations. In
other words, it is easy to consider modified conditions that differ along the two mentioned dimensions, the
number of s and the number of original treatment groups, for example conditions requiring three of four
quartiles, four of five quintiles, etc. Much as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) provides a means for
model selection through trade-off between goodness of fit and model complexity, selection of the
appropriate modified common support condition is dictated by the desired trade-off of the amount of
balancing and bias reduction sacrificed compared to the amount of estimation power gained under each
modification.
45
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significance of the GPS coefficients is noteworthy.46 This significance signals that
selection is important, confirming that the inclusion of the GPS terms and the GPS
estimation process in general are indeed worthwhile in achieving some level of selection
bias removal.
Finally, I estimate the dose-response function, capturing the average potential
outcome at each and every treatment intensity :
∑

,

,

.

I report both the dose-response function and its derivative, the treatment effect
function, in Figure 2.3.
Marginal Contributions
By calculating the marginal exports associated with each treatment level,
, where

and

represent estimated exports and

actual migrant stocks (backed out from the respective logarithmic transformations) and
denotes the ordinal value of treatment intensities employed in the estimation of the doseresponse function, the nonlinearities present in the exports-migration relationship are now
clearly on visual display in Figures 2.4 and 2.5.
Considering the benchmark OLS state-state estimate of $3061 extra exports per
extra migrant, this average contribution of migration to exports is clearly weighted by the
first migrants from one respective Mexican state to the state of U.S. residence. The first
migrant makes a marginal contribution of $76,297 to exports, the hundredth contributes
$3613, and the thousandth contributes $175. Marginal contributions of $8371, $1879, and

46

I choose to include the GPS only linearly as higher-order GPS terms (squared and cubed) do not add
extra information and are not statistically significant.
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$166, respectively, correspond to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles (
1026) of the actual state-state migrant stock distribution for the

33, 216, and
1429 sample.

Marginal exports of $3061 matches to a migrant stock of 123, representing the 42nd
percentile of the actual state-state migrant stock distribution. Interestingly, at the level of
2276 migrants, the marginal contribution is temporarily “exhausted,” and dips below zero
until 3761 migrants; this negative marginal contribution to exports bottoms out at -$4.53.
However, only 66 of the 1429 (less than 5%) state-state migrant stocks fall in this
exhaustion zone range. Total exports quickly recovers from the short-lived negative effect
of migration, reaching the pre-exhaustion zone level of exports as early as 4900 migrants,
with subsequent migrants all making increasingly positive marginal contributions to statestate exports.
The estimated dose-response and treatment-effect functions provide clear answers
to the three central questions of interest posed at the beginning of this paper. First, there is
no minimum level of migration (other than one) necessary to generate positive returns in
terms of exports; in fact, an individual migrant has the largest pro-trade effect when there
are few migrants of the corresponding state-state classification. Second, while there does
exist a small range of migrant stocks over which the marginal contribution of migrants
turns slightly negative, this negative contribution is extremely temporary, as further
migration returns the marginal contribution increasingly positive over the remaining range
of state-state migrant stocks. Finally, because the marginal contribution remains positive
beyond the exhaustion zone, the pro-trade effect of migration can only be maximized by
the maximum level of observed state-state migration.
Conclusion
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Migrants indeed create a significant force in promoting extra trade from U.S. states
of residence to Mexican states of origin. This finding is empirically consistent not only in
statistical significance, but also in magnitude across the varied methods, specifications, and
samples employed in this paper. Without consideration of potential nonlinearities and
differing geographic proximities in an augmented gravity model, the elasticity of state-state
exports to migration is 0.11, translating into $3061 extra annual exports per average extra
migrant for a particular US-Mexico state-state combination, holding other factors constant.
On the other hand, the application of generalized propensity scores permits the potential of
nonlinearities in the migration-trade relationship, results pointing to a diminishing yet
positive marginal contribution of migration to exports as migrant stock size increases over
most of the range of measured migrant stocks. These results contribute the first evidence
of the pro-trade effect of migration at the state-state level, a relatively localized level
capable of measuring more accurately the potential determinants of trade and
differentiating between migrant networks of varied state origin.
Additionally, this paper unmasks the importance of distinct geographic proximities
that the use of one migration variable disguises. Through the examination of not only instate migration, but also neighboring-state and other-state migration, geographic proximity
is revealed to indeed be a relevant factor in determining the pro-trade effect of migration,
with networks suffering lower amounts of spatial separation making larger contributions
to trade. Both in-state and neighboring-state migration make significantly positive
contributions to state-state exports, with estimated elasticities of 0.07 and 0.08,
respectively, resulting in partial contributions to average state-state exports of $1984 and
$538. Combining the three contributions from migration of separate geographic
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proximities gives an overall addition to state-state exports of $3792 by the average extra
migrant.
Empirical studies employing data sets from countries other than the U.S. and
Mexico, or classifying data by characteristics such as migrants' education level and
participation in business networks, offer clear avenues for further research at the state-state
level, just as they already have at the country-country level. In addition, sorting trade and
migration data by industry, as well as decomposing the pro-trade effect into the intensive
and extensive contributions, provides promising extensions. Furthermore, the very
existence of the exhaustion zone gives another direction for related research specifically
focusing on the GPS method: first, in verifying that a similar shape of the dose-response
and treatment-effect functions obtains using other data, and second, in hypothesizing why
it is that the exhaustion zone may exist yet does not extend to the larger migrant stocks
providing positive contributions to state-state exports. Finally, the results not only shed
light on how localized migration's nexus with trade may be and how geographic proximity
matters, they inevitably connect to the ongoing debate in a host of countries as to the
economic costs and benefits of migration. Without a doubt, the pro-trade effect of both instate and neighboring-state migration cannot be ignored in any careful analysis of the costs
and benefits of migration.

Appendix: GPS robustness checks
As a first check on the robustness of the results, I carry out the GPS estimation
adding the 48 observations corresponding to Mexico City into the sample, resulting in a
starting sample size of 1536 state-state relationships, later reduced to 1478 after exclusion
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according to the modified common support condition. If results are indeed robust to the
inclusion of the extra Mexico City observations, the potential worries created by this
sampling decision are minimized. Tables A.3 to A.7 and Figure A.2 display the key results
for the larger sample, exhibiting only minor changes from the tables and figures highlighted
previously. The GPS estimation allows for an improvement in balance from only 36%
before the GPS to 76% after the GPS adjustment of covariate comparisons reflecting a lack
of statistically significant differences at the 5% level; all but 3 covariate comparisons show
lack of statistical significance after both GPS adjustment and exclusion based on the
modified common support condition. The dose-response function in Figure A.2 is shifted
slightly downward from that displayed in Figure 2.3, due to a slight decrease across the
board in marginal exports associated with the marginal migrant. The inclusion of the
Mexico City observations results in a dose-response function that corresponds to marginal
contributions of $8118, $1678, and $158, respectively, for the 25th, 50th, and 75th
percentiles (
the

34, 228, and 1094) of the actual state-state migrant stock distribution for

1478 sample. Furthermore, the downward shift results in an increased range for

the exhaustion zone, now made up of migrant stocks between 2033 and 4465,
corresponding to 7.4% of state-state migrant stocks.
Additionally, as detailed above, concerns may exist as to how well the matrícula
consular data represents the actual state-state migrant distribution. In turn, I conduct a
second check for robustness further excluding all observations associated with Texas and
Illinois, the two outlier states from the original sample, resulting in a revised sample of
1426 state-state observations, then reduced to 1380 by exclusion following the modified
common support condition. The corresponding dose-response and treatment effect
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functions are highlighted in Figure A.3, once again reflecting slight changes in outcomes
from the original generalized propensity scores estimation. The GPS adjustment and use
of the modified common support condition again provide a balancing of covariates,
improving the percentage lacking statistically significant differences at the 5% level from
33% to 87% to 94% of all possible covariate comparisons. Without the observations
corresponding to Texas and Illinois, the dose-response and treatment effect functions again
shift slightly downward, resulting in an exhaustion zone bordered by migrant stocks of 964
and 8845, corresponding to 21.0% of state-state migrant stocks. Marginal contributions of
$9238, $1641, and $18, respectively, correspond to the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles
(

31, 201, and 914) of the actual state-state migrant stock distribution for the

1380 sample.

Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics – base and alternative samples
Base sample
Base sample minus
Base sample minus Texas
Variable
1536
Mexico City
1488 and Illinois
1472
Exports (in USD) 81,993,616
73,115,405
50,679,743
(674,482,678)
(658,528,331)
(385,569,081)
0/17,900,000,000 0/17,900,000,00
0/11,800,000,000

81

Migration

3038
(13,771)
0/270,201
12,409
Migration
(27,591)
1/308,918
Migration
130,355
(124,937)
858/525,394
Distance (miles) 2078
(597)
239/3681
Adjacency
0.006
(0.076)
0/1
US GSP
34,392.30
(bn. USD)
(39,909.53)
2,950/218,967
Mex. GSP
2,969.87
(bn. USD)
(3,197.62)
529/17,097

2938
(13,634)
0/270,201
12,070
(27,410)
1/308,918
126,016
(124,375)
858/525,394
2077
(600)
239/3681
0.006
(0.077)
0/1
34,392.30
(39,909.53)
2,950/218,967
2,514.13
(1,975.85)
529/9,235

2377
(12,786)
0/270,201
12,770
(28,108)
1/308,918
130,655
(125,141)
858/525,394
2106
(585)
239/3681
0.004
(0.059)
0/1
31,232.81
(37,118.12)
2,950/218,967
2,969.87
(3,197.62)
529/17,097

Notes: For each variable, means are listed first, standard deviations are reported in parentheses, while
minimum/maximum pairs are reported in italics.

Table 2.2. Coefficient estimates using gravity equation (OLS, state fixed effects)
Dependent variable: US-Mexico state-state exports
Independent variable (1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Migration
0.1134***
0.2403***
0.1635***
0.1372*** 0.0735*
(0.0382)
(0.0348)
(0.0420)
(0.0426) (0.0432)
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Migration

0.1354***
(0.0418)

Migration
Distance
Adjacency
Economy size

-1.5952***
(0.2913)
1.2308***
(0.4449)
0.9365***
(0.1391)
0.8192
1536

0.8116
1536

0.8130
1536

0.0742
0.0814*
(0.0457) (0.0457)
-0.5031*** -0.0215
(0.1539) (0.1685)
-1.4335***
(0.3177)
1.3146***
(0.4531)
1.1589***
(0.1607)
0.8143
0.8197
1536
1536

Notes: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the logarithm of U.S.-Mexico state-state exports
in U.S. dollars plus one as the dependent variable, employing the base sample of the 48 contiguous U.S.
states and 32 Mexican states. All regressions include state fixed effects, controlling for any existing
systematic differences across states that may affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) displays estimates for
coefficients corresponding to the initial OLS equation. Column (2) reports estimates using only Migration
as an explanatory variable, column (4) adds
as an explanatory variable, column (3) adds Migration
and column (5) displays the preferred specification, adding the remainder of the relevant
Migration
controls. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and **
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Authors
My estimates

Aleksynska
& Peri (2011)
APR (2012)

Felbermayr &
Jung (2009)
HS (2005)
Peri & Requeña
(2010)

White (2007)

Table 2.3. Comparison of estimates for the elasticity of exports to migration
Elasticity of exports
Extra annual exports
to migration
generated per extra migrant Sample
Specification-Method
0.07 (in-state)
$1984 (in-state)
48 US states, 32
Pooled cross section, OLS with
0.08 (neighboring-state) $3792 (across all states)
Mexican states,
state-state trading partner fixed
2006-10
effects
0.25
$24,895
CEPII “square”
Pooled cross section, OLS with
gravity data set,
country-country fixed effects
5230 observations
0.02, 0.08, 0.07
--Italy, Portugal, and Panel, OLS with country-time
(in-state)
Spain, “about 100
and trading partner pairs
0.00, 0.02, -0.04
--countries,” 2002-10 fixed effects
(neighboring-state)
0.11
$2717
21 “North” countries Pooled cross section, OLS,
and 114 “South”
differenced with country-country
countries, 1988-2000 fixed effects
0.16 (in-state)
--50 US states, 36
Pooled cross section, Tobit and
0.07 (other-state)
countries, 1993-96
LAD
0.05-0.11
--50 Spanish
Panel, OLS, 2SLS with countryprovinces, 77
time and trading partner pairs
countries, 1993fixed effects
2008
0.11
$2608
US, 73 countries,
Pooled cross section, OLS with
1980-2001
country-country fixed effects

Notes: Estimates for elasticity are reported according to the preferred model specified by the authors in the corresponding articles, or if not specified, the most
appropriate estimates for comparison to those of this paper. My estimates are those corresponding to the preferred base sample. Other articles' estimates are
the following: the OLS fixed effects result for Aleksynska and Peri (2011), the benchmark OLS result for APR, the differenced result for Felbermayr and Jung
(2009), the Tobit result for HS (2005), and the full sample result for White (2007). Figures for column 3 are generated according to the reported elasticities,
multiplying the respective elasticity by the ratio of average state-state exports to average state-state stock of migrants; --- denotes that I found neither the
corresponding summary statistics nor the estimate of the annual value of extra exports generated per migrant.
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Table 2.4. Coefficient estimates using gravity equation, alternate samples (OLS, state fixed effects)
Dependent variable: US-Mexico state-state exports,
1488 and
1472
Independent variable
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Migration
0.2394*** 0.2349*** 0.1616*** 0.1554*** 0.1351*** 0.1355*** 0.0671
0.0764*
(0.0354) (0.0360) (0.0428) (0.0436) (0.0434) (0.0440) (0.0440) (0.0444)
Migration
0.1382*** 0.1371*** 0.0748
0.0725
0.0782*
0.0767
(0.0431) (0.0429)
(0.0472) (0.0475) (0.0471) (0.0476)
Migration
-0.5101*** -0.5032*** -0.0058
-0.0653
(0.1565) (0.1608) (0.1713) (0.1730)
Distance
-1.5813*** -1.3860***
(0.3289) (0.3351)
Adjacency
1.2479*** 1.7183***
(0.4603) (0.6060)
Economy size
0.9927*** 1.1865***
(0.1510) (0.1656)
0.7989
0.7965
0.8004
0.7980
0.8019
0.7994
0.8081
0.8052
1488
1472
1488
1472
1488
1472
1488
1472
Notes: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the logarithm of US-Mexico state-state exports in US dollars plus one as the dependent variable,
employing the two alternative samples. All regressions include state fixed effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across states that may
as an explanatory
affect all states' outcomes. Column (1) reports estimates using only Migration as an explanatory variable, column (2) adds Migration
and column (4) displays the preferred specification, adding the remainder of the relevant controls. Heteroskedasticityvariable, column (3) adds Migration
consistent robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5. and with alternative (in)dependent variables (OLS, state fixed effects)
Base sample
Base sample minus Mexico
Base sample minus Texas
(In)dependent variable
1536
City
1488
and Illinois
1472
U.S.-Mexico state-state exports 2008
0.0929** (0.0445)
0.0849* (0.0454)
0.0935** (0.0455)
Migration 2006-08
Migration

2006-08

0.0859*
0.8028
U.S.-Mexico state-state exports 2009
0.0803*
Migration 2006-09

(0.0484)

0.0850* (0.0498)
0.7908

0.0875*
0.7991

(0.0489)

(0.0461)

0.0731

(0.0470)

0.0824*

(0.0470)

Migration

(0.0492)

0.0505
0.7806

(0.0508)

0.0548
0.7898

(0.0499)

2006-09

0.0547
0.7940

Notes: Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, while ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
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J
Exports measure
Migration measure
Migration
Migration
Migration
Distance
Adjacency
Economy size

Table 2.6. Coefficient estimates using forwarded exports (OLS, state fixed effects)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
2008
2009
2010
2009
2010
2010
2006-07
2006-07
2006-07
2006-08
2006-08
2006-09
0.1006**
0.1013**
0.0980**
0.0922**
0.0926**
0.0789*
(0.0444)
(0.0446)
(0.0446)
(0.0447)
(0.0447)
(0.0461)
0.0824*
0.0473
0.0533
0.0514
0.0558
0.0599
(0.0484)
(0.0486)
(0.0486)
(0.0486)
(0.0486)
(0.0492)
-0.0938
-0.1593
-0.0024
-0.1614
-0.0035
-0.0083
(0.1809)
(0.1818)
(0.1816)
(0.1818)
(0.1816)
(0.1817)
-1.4556*** -1.3079*** -1.6222*** -1.3146*** -1.6242*** -1.6367***
(0.3390)
(0.3405)
(0.3402)
(0.3410)
(0.3407)
(0.3417)
1.3076***
1.2909***
0.9733***
1.2990***
0.9791***
0.9907***
(0.4866)
(0.4889)
(0.4884)
(0.4889)
(0.4884)
(0.4886)
1.3044***
1.2673***
1.1223***
1.2717***
1.1242***
1.1360***
(0.1723)
(0.1731)
(0.1729)
(0.1733)
(0.1731)
(0.1731)
0.8029
0.7943
0.8076
0.7941
0.8075
0.8073
1536
1536
1536
1536
1536
1536

Notes: Each estimate is from a separate OLS regression with the logarithm of U.S.-Mexico state-state exports in U.S. dollars plus one as the dependent variable,
employing the base sample of the 48 contiguous U.S. states and 32 Mexican states. All regressions include state fixed effects, controlling for any existing
systematic differences across states that may affect all states' outcomes. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,
** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

87

Table 2.7. Coefficient estimates using gravity equation, migrant share
(OLS, state fixed effects)
Base sample minus Base sample minus
Base sample
Mexico City
Texas and Illinois
Independent variable
1536
1488
1472
Migrant share
0.1251**
0.1172*
0.1397**
(0.0620)
(0.0631)
(0.0636)
Distance
-1.7645***
-1.8887***
-1.7565***
(0.2815)
(0.2893)
(0.2958)
Adjacency
1.2013***
1.1264**
1.5184**
(0.4461)
(0.4529)
(0.5984)
Economy size
1.2147***
0.6784***
1.1359***
(0.0907)
(0.1718)
(0.1204)
0.8186
0.8072
0.8041
1536
1488
1472
Notes: Each column of estimates is from a separate OLS regression with the logarithm of U.S.-Mexico statestate exports in U.S. dollars plus one as the dependent variable, employing the two alternative samples. All
regressions include state fixed effects, controlling for any existing systematic differences across states that
may affect all states' outcomes. Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ***, ** and ** denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table 2.8. OLS estimation, dependent variable:
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(migrants)

Covariates and statistics
U.S. population
U.S. population
Mex. Population
Mex. population
U.S. GSP
U.S. GSP
Mex. GSP
Mex. GSP
U.S. pop. growth
Mex. pop. growth
U.S. GSP growth
Mex. GSP growth
Adjacency
Distance
U.S. unemployment
Mex. unemployment
U.S. Gini
Mex. Gini
Constant
Obervations

Estimated coefficient
20.31***
-0.75***
-5.82**
0.26***
-7.46**
0.48***
-0.03
-0.05
6.58***
-7.12***
2.11***
2.05***
-0.17
-3.00***
0.32***
0.10**
-33.60***
19.86***
-47.89***
1488
0.76
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Standard error
4.18
0.14
2.28
0.08
3.14
0.14
1.75
0.09
0.44
0.75
0.68
0.46
0.46
0.14
0.04
0.04
2.38
13.32
16.70

Table 2.9. Groups and blocks, full sample
Control 1
Group 2
Control 2
Group 3
958
37
651
37
64
37
108
37
30
37
65
37
17
37
81
38
18
37
54
37
14
38
22
37
5
37
30
38
2
37
52
37
4
37
31
37
3
37
23
37

Block
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Group 1
37
37
38
37
38
37
37
38
37
37

Control 3
565
122
76
72
71
73
44
29
41
23

Group 4
37
37
37
37
37
38
37
37
37
37

Control 4
738
123
100
47
25
29
15
13
13
14

Block
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Table 2.10. Groups and blocks, modified common support sample
Group 1
Control 1
Group 2
Control 2
Group 3
Control 3
33
944
37
592
37
506
34
62
37
108
37
122
33
29
37
65
37
76
34
26
37
81
38
72
34
12
37
54
37
71
33
10
38
22
37
73
34
3
37
30
38
44
33
1
37
52
37
29
34
5
37
31
37
41
33
2
37
23
37
23

Group 4
35
35
35
35
35
35
35
35
35
35

Control 4
742
132
78
28
27
19
14
13
12
14
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Table 2.11. Three-stage balancing comparison of covariates
Before balancing on GPS
After balancing on GPS
Common support after balancing
T-stats
1488
(weighted t-stats)
1488
GPS (weighted t-stats)
1429
Covariate
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
U.S. population
21.72 0.12 -4.04 -16.19
2.52 -0.41 0.41 -3.49
0.83 -0.30 0.42 -1.28
21.19 0.29 -3.69 -16.37
2.39 -0.40 0.46 -3.62
0.79 -0.30 0.47 -1.26
U.S. population
Mex. Population
9.45 4.74 -2.67 -11.69
2.25 1.41 -0.25 -2.65
1.21 1.58 -0.18 -1.82
Mex. population
9.30 4.80 -2.55 -11.74
2.17 1.42 -0.23 -2.69
1.17 1.57 -0.16 -1.86
U.S. GSP
21.39 0.18 -3.63 -16.50
2.30 -0.42 0.41 -3.65
0.61 -0.30 0.44 -1.35
U.S. GSP
20.56 0.41 -3.15 -16.66
2.11 -0.41 0.50 -3.79
0.56 -0.31 0.51 -1.33
Mex. GSP
5.40 0.08 -0.39 -5.07
1.35 0.32 0.39 -1.10
0.96 0.36 0.41 -0.36
Mex. GSP
5.26 0.08 -0.31 -5.02
1.31 0.30 0.40 -1.13
0.94 0.34 0.42 -0.38
U.S. pop. growth
6.52 2.16 -2.22 -6.46
1.51 0.81 -0.23 -2.11
1.27 0.72 -0.28 -1.43
Mex. pop. growth
-2.87 2.67 0.27 -0.07
0.36 0.57 0.21 -0.28
0.51 0.55 0.19 -0.50
U.S. GSP growth
-6.76 -0.12 3.64 3.18
0.10 0.77 0.92 -0.08
0.04 0.66 0.85 0.24
Mex. GSP growth
-0.88 1.08 1.61 -1.78
-0.29 0.44 0.81 0.31
-0.32 0.45 0.82 0.15
Adjacency
1.74 1.73 0.96 -4.48
-0.59 0.73 0.41 -6.25
0.26 0.34 -0.32 0.13
Distance
-14.03 -0.47 7.18 6.72
-4.75 -0.47 1.62 4.14
-4.18 -0.45 1.95 0.20
U.S. unemployment 10.04 -0.10 -2.43 -7.26
1.03 0.32 0.55 -0.17
0.42 0.42 0.60 -0.34
Mex. unemployment 1.31 -1.67 -3.10 3.41
1.62 0.01 -0.70 0.55
1.51 0.00 -0.66 0.91
U.S. Gini
9.40 -1.23 -1.75 -6.19
1.37 -0.31 0.47 -1.91
0.32 -0.26 0.46 -0.59
Mex. Gini
6.18 4.31 -3.50 -7.00
1.46 0.40 -0.87 -0.68
1.16 0.53 -0.83 -0.52
Avg. absolute t-stat
5.46, 24/72 < |1.96|
1.22, 57/72 < |1.96|
0.71, 71/72 < |1.96|
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Table 2.12. Covariate means: included vs. excluded observations
Mean of common
Mean of excluded
Covariates
support observations
observations
U.S. population
15.14
15.18
Mex. population
14.50
14.70
U.S. GSP
12.04
12.09
Mex. GSP
9.77
9.86
U.S. pop. growth
0.03
0.03
Mex. pop. growth
0.09
0.09
U.S. GSP growth
0.07
0.07
Mex. GSP growth
0.08
0.08
Adjacency
0.00
0.01
Distance
7.58
7.60
U.S. unemployment 5.66
5.67
Mex. unemployment 3.82
3.77
U.S. Gini
0.45
0.45
Mex. Gini
0.47
0.48

Table 2.13. OLS estimation, dependent variable: (exports)
Covariates and statistics
Estimated coefficient
Standard error
Migrant stock
1.06***
0.30
Migrant stock
-0.18***
0.07
0.01***
0.00
Migrant stock
GPS
-5.65***
2.54
Migrant stock GPS
1.54***
0.44
Constant
11.75***
0.60
Observations
1429
0.11
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Table A.1. Matrículas consulares registered 2006 to 2010, U.S. states of residence
and Mexican states of origin: total of 4,659,656
U.S.
Mexico
Alabama 27,442
Oklahoma 19,867
Aguascalientes 42,799
Arizona 187,032
Oregon 74,103
Baja California 45,183
Arkansas 19,711
Pennsylvania 23,555
Baja California Sur 3,178
California 1,682,667
Rhode Island 931
Campeche 7,017
Colorado 105,125
South Carolina 38,551
Chiapas 62,697
Connecticut 10,645
South Dakota 723
Chihuahua 120,933
Delaware 6,637
Tennessee 38,736
Coahuila 56,687
Florida 107,392
Texas 779,636
Colima 32,326
Georgia 150,704
Utah 55,330
Durango 126,923
Idaho 16,340
Vermont 345
Guanajuato 377,674
Illinois 387,377
Virginia 24,492
Guerrero 371,279
Indiana 69,247
Washington 64,436
Hidalgo 131,280
Iowa 15,953
West Virginia 663
Jalisco 425,607
Kansas 21,981
Wisconsin 43,532
Mexico 238,343
Kentucky 14,428
Wyoming 3,563
Mexico City 293,920
Louisiana 8,074
Michoacan 525,514
Maine 232
Morelos 105,732
Maryland 20,729
Nayarit 72,227
Massachusetts 2,629
Nuevo Leon 77,824
Michigan 22,417
Oaxaca 283,295
Minnesota 38,019
Puebla 307,606
Missouri 17,103
Queretaro 58,608
Mississippi 5,600
Quintana Roo 3,470
Montana 164
San Luis Potosi 155,069
Nebraska 22,291
Sinaloa 91,019
New Hampshire 854
Sonora 49,074
New Jersey 73,881
Tabasco 72,502
New Mexico 53,212
Tamaulipas 98,290
New York 133,625
Tlaxcala 35,293
Nevada 108,310
Veracruz 205,799
North Carolina 142,813
Yucatan 17,837
North Dakota 54
Zacatecas 170,686
Ohio 18,505
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Table A.2. Migration and trade in top U.S. states of Mexican migrant residence
California
Texas
Rank Migration
Exports
Migration
Exports
1
Michoacan
Baja California
Guanajuato
Chihuahua
2
Jalisco
Mexico
San Luis Potosi
Tamaulipas
3
Guerrero
Chihuahua
Tamaulipas
Mexico City
4
Oaxaca
Mexico City
Nuevo Leon
Mexico
5
Mexico City
Jalisco
Michoacan
Coahuila
6
Guanajuato
Sonora
Guerrero
Nuevo Leon
7
Puebla
Nuevo Leon
Zacatecas
Guanajuato
8
Mexico
Sinaloa
Mexico
Jalisco
9
Zacatecas
Tamaulipas
Coahuila
Queretaro
10
Sinaloa
Puebla
Mexico City
Aguascalientes
11
Nayarit
Baja California Sur Veracruz
San Luis Potosi
12
Veracruz
Queretaro
Jalisco
Veracruz
13
Morelos
Guanajuato
Durango
Hidalgo
14
Hidalgo
Coahuila
Chihuahua
Sonora
15
Baja California
Aguascalientes
Hidalgo
Durango
16
Durango
Durango
Puebla
Tabasco
17
Tabasco
San Luis Potosi
Queretaro
Baja California
18
Colima
Quintana Roo
Oaxaca
Puebla
19
Queretaro
Tlaxcala
Morelos
Michoacan
20
Chiapas
Veracruz
Aguascalientes
Sinaloa
21
Sonora
Hidalgo
Tabasco
Morelos
22
Yucatan
Michoacan
Chiapas
Quintana Roo
23
Aguascalientes
Morelos
Tlaxcala
Campeche
24
Tlaxcala
Yucatan
Sinaloa
Colima
25
Chihuahua
Campeche
Colima
Zacatecas
26
San Luis Potosi
Nayarit
Nayarit
Tlaxcala
27
Coahuila
Tabasco
Campeche
Yucatan
28
Tamaulipas
Zacatecas
Baja California
Oaxaca
29
Nuevo Leon
Chiapas
Yucatan
Chiapas
30
Campeche
Colima
Sonora
Baja California
31
Quintana Roo
Oaxaca
Quintana Roo
Guerrero
32
Baja California Sur Guerrero
Baja California Sur Nayarit
Notes: States of origin are listed in order of number of matrículas consulares in the period of 2006 to 2010
and value of state-state exports in 2010.
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Table A.3. OLS estimation, dependent variable: (migrants)
Covariates and statistics
Estimated coefficient
Standard error
U.S. population
19.33***
4.09
U.S. population
-0.72***
0.14
Mex. Population
-2.73
1.89
0.15**
0.06
Mex. population
U.S. GSP
-6.61**
3.08
U.S. GSP
0.44***
0.13
Mex. GSP
-3.39***
1.05
Mex. GSP
0.12**
0.05
U.S. pop. growth
6.62***
0.43
Mex. pop. growth
-6.84***
0.74
U.S. GSP growth
2.20***
0.66
Mex. GSP growth
1.94***
0.45
Adjacency
-0.08
0.45
Distance
-2.92***
0.14
U.S. unemployment
0.32***
0.04
Mex. unemployment
0.10**
0.04
U.S. Gini
-33.02***
2.33
Mex. Gini
20.95***
1.41
Constant
-53.49***
16.32
Obervations
1536
0.77
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Table A.4. Groups and blocks, full sample
Control 1
Group 2
Control 2
Group 3
994
38
643
38
57
38
130
38
38
39
68
39
17
38
88
38
16
38
46
38
15
39
43
39
5
38
26
38
2
39
52
39
3
38
29
38
3
38
28
38

Block
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Group 1
38
39
39
38
39
39
38
39
39
38

Control 3
592
126
65
83
66
62
45
50
38
26

Group 4
38
38
39
39
38
38
39
39
38
38

Control 4
777
114
107
44
29
26
19
11
9
16

Block
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Table A.5. Groups and blocks, modified common support sample
Group 1
Control 1
Group 2
Control 2
Group 3
Control 3
34
977
38
593
38
534
35
58
38
124
38
126
35
35
38
67
39
65
36
26
39
89
38
83
35
10
38
45
38
66
35
10
38
43
39
62
34
6
39
26
38
45
36
1
38
52
39
50
34
3
38
29
38
38
35
3
38
28
38
26

Group 4
36
37
36
37
36
36
37
37
36
36

Control 4
772
144
57
40
27
27
12
13
6
16
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Table A.6. Three-stage balancing comparison of covariates
Before balancing on GPS
After balancing on GPS
Common support after balancing
T-stats
1536
(weighted t-stats)
1536
GPS (weighted t-stats)
1478
Covariate
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
U.S. population
22.15 0.02 -3.60 -17.21
2.66 -0.27 0.59 -4.05
1.07 -0.35 0.61 -1.93
21.63 0.19 -3.26 -17.41
2.52 -0.25 0.64 -4.19
1.03 -0.34 0.65 -1.93
U.S. population
Mex. Population
9.84 5.53 -3.38 -12.23
2.22 1.48 -0.57 -2.45
1.24 1.62 -0.48 -1.61
Mex. population
9.70 5.61 -3.27 -12.29
2.15 1.50 -0.57 -2.48
1.20 1.64 -0.48 -1.63
U.S. GSP
21.90 0.05 -3.18 -17.56
2.39 -0.26 0.60 -4.19
0.80 -0.35 0.63 -2.01
U.S. GSP
21.05 0.29 -2.70 -17.75
2.20 -0.23 0.68 -4.35
0.74 -0.33 0.70 -2.01
Mex. GSP
5.73 1.71 -1.03 -6.44
1.08 0.70 0.09 -1.13
0.69 0.75 0.13 -0.37
Mex. GSP
5.59 1.80 -0.97 -6.46
0.97 0.70 0.09 -1.15
0.66 0.76 0.12 -0.40
U.S. pop. growth
6.26 2.13 -2.08 -6.32
1.40 0.83 0.03 -2.02
1.19 0.75 -0.05 -0.88
Mex. pop. growth
-3.03 1.47 0.75 0.81
0.35 -0.20 0.40 -0.27
0.53 -0.21 0.37 -0.31
U.S. GSP growth
-6.91 0.47 2.87 3.50
0.05 -0.93 0.86 -0.04
0.09 0.78 0.78 0.37
Mex. GSP growth
-0.93 0.62 1.71 -1.39
-0.41 0.55 0.85 0.24
-0.45 0.81 0.85 0.12
Adjacency
1.74 1.73 0.96 -4.47
0.59 0.72 0.37 -6.34
0.32 0.42 -0.04 0.00
Distance
-14.13 0.04 7.17 6.31
-4.54 0.09 1.37 4.16
-3.92 0.25 1.64 0.02
U.S. unemployment 10.37 -0.25 -2.23 -7.71
1.13 0.31 0.36 -0.50
0.58 0.36 0.43 -0.47
Mex. unemployment 1.81 -0.63 -2.72 1.54
1.28 0.10 -0.55 0.21
1.15 0.12 -0.51 0.52
U.S. Gini
9.74 -1.24 -1.56 -6.77
1.34 0.08 0.84 -2.51
0.45 -0.13 0.82 -0.99
Mex. Gini
6.48 4.38 -4.11 -6.76
1.83 0.48 -1.00 -0.42
1.50 0.68 -0.93 -0.65
Avg. absolute t-stat
5.66, 26/72 < |1.96|
1.28, 55/72 < |1.96|
0.76, 69/72 < |1.96|
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Table A.7. OLS estimation, dependent variable: (exports)
Covariates and statistics
Estimated coefficient
Standard error
Migrant stock
1.11***
0.30
Migrant stock
-0.21***
0.07
0.01***
0.00
Migrant stock
GPS
-7.58***
2.50
Migrant stock GPS
1.91***
0.43
Constant
12.03***
0.59
Observations
1478
0.13

Table A.8. OLS estimation, dependent variable: (migrants)
Covariates and statistics
Estimated coefficient
Standard error
U.S. population
20.11***
4.16
-0.75***
0.14
U.S. population
Mex. Population
-6.46***
2.31
Mex. population
0.28***
0.08
U.S. GSP
-8.01***
3.15
U.S. GSP
0.50***
0.14
Mex. GSP
0.11
1.77
Mex. GSP
-0.06
0.09
U.S. pop. growth
6.71***
0.44
Mex. pop. growth
-7.11***
0.76
U.S. GSP growth
2.14***
0.67
Mex. GSP growth
2.04***
0.46
Adjacency
-0.13
0.60
Distance
-3.15***
0.15
U.S. unemployment
0.320**
0.04
Mex. unemployment
0.08**
0.04
U.S. Gini
-33.48***
2.36
Mex. Gini
20.35***
1.51
Constant
-38.22***
16.78
Obervations
1426
0.75
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Table A.9. Groups and blocks, full sample
Control 1
Group 2
Control 2
Group 3
910
35
614
35
51
35
90
36
33
35
65
36
17
35
63
36
22
35
64
35
15
35
34
36
6
35
39
36
2
35
35
36
5
35
41
36
2
35
31
35

Block
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Group 1
36
36
37
36
37
36
36
37
36
36

Control 3
521
125
72
55
82
61
41
47
24
41

Group 4
35
36
36
35
36
36
35
36
36
35

Control 4
752
97
90
42
29
25
22
6
7
0

Block
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Table A.10. Groups and blocks, modified common support sample
Group 1
Control 1
Group 2
Control 2
Group 3
Control 3
32
904
34
576
35
475
33
59
35
88
36
125
33
28
36
61
36
72
33
22
34
65
36
55
33
16
36
61
35
82
32
12
35
34
36
61
33
4
35
40
36
41
33
1
34
34
36
47
33
5
36
41
36
24
32
2
34
31
35
41

Group 4
34
35
35
35
35
34
35
35
35
34

Control 4
709
102
88
42
31
26
18
8
8
1
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Table A.11. Three-stage balancing comparison of covariates
Before balancing on GPS
After balancing on GPS
Common support after balancing
T-stats
1426
(weighted t-stats)
1426
GPS (weighted t-stats)
1380
Covariate
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
U.S. population
21.14 -1.16 -3.86 -14.54
2.61 -0.87 0.29 -1.03
1.13 -0.85 0.40 -0.79
20.62 -1.06 -3.53 -14.63
2.47 -0.89 0.35 -1.18
1.08 -0.88 0.45 -0.75
U.S. population
Mex. Population
9.27 5.13 -2.88 -11.78
2.32 1.27 -0.40 -2.64
1.28 1.45 -0.30 -2.57
Mex. population
9.12 5.20 -2.74 -11.85
2.24 1.29 -0.37 -2.71
1.23 1.46 -0.27 -2.63
U.S. GSP
20.79 -1.21 -3.43 -14.71
2.39 -0.90 0.30 -1.08
0.90 -0.88 0.42 -0.85
U.S. GSP
19.97 -1.06 -2.97 -14.76
2.21 -0.92 0.38 -1.02
0.84 -0.91 0.49 -0.79
Mex. GSP
5.36 0.88 -1.11 -5.14
1.48 0.42 0.22 -1.36
1.16 0.51 0.25 -1.38
Mex. GSP
5.21 0.89 -1.03 -5.10
1.44 0.43 0.24 -1.40
1.14 0.51 0.26 -1.42
U.S. pop. growth
6.00 2.59 -2.42 -6.20
1.16 1.09 -0.11 -1.44
1.12 1.04 -0.12 -1.32
Mex. pop. growth
-2.92 2.34 0.80 -0.19
0.45 0.73 0.38 -0.50
0.65 0.79 0.36 -0.53
U.S. GSP growth
-6.90 0.02 3.11 3.73
-0.49 1.06 1.03 0.21
-0.25 0.97 0.98 0.21
Mex. GSP growth
-1.10 1.21 1.72 -1.82
-0.36 0.58 0.93 0.60
-0.37 0.81 0.91 0.52
Adjacency
1.31 1.28 0.26 -2.85
0.45 0.48 0.26 0.13
0.27 0.31 -0.28 0.12
Distance
-13.11 -0.71 9.23 4.23
-4.46 -0.75 1.98 0.69
-3.92 -0.79 2.08 0.34
U.S. unemployment 10.08 -0.28 -1.65 -8.05
1.47 0.04 0.67 -0.38
0.88 0.05 0.69 -0.28
Mex. unemployment 1.19 -1.28 -3.53 3.62
1.68 0.02 -0.53 0.11
1.67 0.07 -0.52 0.13
U.S. Gini
8.55 -1.58 -2.07 -4.79
1.31 -0.41 0.45 -0.52
0.59 -0.40 0.53 -0.36
Mex. Gini
6.08 3.95 -3.18 -6.89
1.31 -0.06 -1.24 0.34
0.76 0.14 -1.14 0.27
Avg. absolute t-stat
5.35, 24/72 < |1.96|
0.97, 63/72 < |1.96|
0.80, 68/72 < |1.96|
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Table A.12. OLS estimation, dependent variable: (exports)
Covariates and statistics
Estimated coefficient
Standard error
Migrant stock
1.17***
0.31
Migrant stock
-0.20***
0.07
0.01***
0.00
Migrant stock
GPS
-6.26***
2.61
Migrant stock GPS
1.60***
0.46
Constant
11.70***
0.62
Observations
1380
0.10
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Table A.13. State-state observations excluded by modified common support condition, starting sample of
Arizona
Baja California
South Dakota Baja California Sur
Texas
Zacatecas
Arizona
Sonora
South Dakota Colima
Vermont
Aguascalientes
California
Baja California
South Dakota Campeche
Vermont
Baja California
California
Veracruz
South Dakota Quintana Roo
Vermont
Baja California Sur
Maine
Baja California Sur Texas
Chihuahua
Vermont
Colima
Maine
Colima
Texas
Chiapas
Vermont
Campeche
Maine
Quintana Roo
Texas
Coahuila
Vermont
Coahuila
Montana
Colima
Texas
Durango
Vermont
Morelos
Montana
Campeche
Texas
Guerrero
Vermont
Nayarit
Montana
Quintana Roo
Texas
Guanajuato
Vermont
Nuevo Leon
North Dakota
Baja California Sur Texas
Hidalgo
Vermont
Quintana Roo
North Dakota
Colima
Texas
Jalisco
Vermont
Queretaro
North Dakota
Campeche
Texas
Michoacan
Vermont
Sinaloa
North Dakota
Morelos
Texas
Mexico
Vermont
Sonora
North Dakota
Quintana Roo
Texas
Nuevo Leon
Vermont
Tlaxcala
North Dakota
Yucatan
Texas
Oaxaca
Vermont
Tamaulipas
New Hampshire
Baja California Sur Texas
Puebla
Vermont
Yucatan
Rhode Island
Baja California Sur Texas
San Luis Potosi
West Virginia Baja California Sur
Rhode Island
Colima
Texas
Tamaulipas
West Virginia Quintana Roo
Rhode Island
Quintana Roo
Texas
Veracruz
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Table A.14. State-state observations excluded by modified common support condition, starting sample of
Arizona
Baja California
South Dakota Baja California Sur
Texas
Zacatecas
California
Baja California
South Dakota Colima
Vermont
Aguascalientes
Maine
Baja California Sur South Dakota Campeche
Vermont
Baja California
Maine
Colima
South Dakota Quintana Roo
Vermont
Baja California Sur
Maine
Quintana Roo
Texas
Chihuahua
Vermont
Colima
Montana
Colima
Texas
Chiapas
Vermont
Campeche
Montana
Campeche
Texas
Durango
Vermont
Coahuila
Montana
Quintana Roo
Texas
Guerrero
Vermont
Morelos
North Dakota
Baja California Sur Texas
Guanajuato
Vermont
Quintana Roo
North Dakota
Colima
Texas
Hidalgo
Vermont
Queretaro
North Dakota
Campeche
Texas
Jalisco
Vermont
Sinaloa
North Dakota
Morelos
Texas
Michoacan
Vermont
Sonora
North Dakota
Quintana Roo
Texas
Mexico
Vermont
Tabasco
North Dakota
Yucatan
Texas
Mexico City
Vermont
Tlaxcala
New Hampshire
Baja California Sur Texas
Nuevo Leon
Vermont
Tamaulipas
New Hampshire
Baja California Sur Texas
Oaxaca
Vermont
Yucatan
New Hampshire
Quintana Roo
Texas
San Luis Potosi
Vermont
Tamaulipas
Rhode Island
Baja California Sur Texas
Tamaulipas
West Virginia Baja California Sur
Rhode Island
Colima
Texas
Veracruz
West Virginia Quintana Roo
Rhode Island
Quintana Roo
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Table A.15. State-state observations excluded by modified common support condition, starting sample of
Arizona
Baja California
North Dakota
Colima
Vermont
Colima
Arizona
Chihuahua
North Dakota
Campeche
Vermont
Campeche
Arizona
Sonora
North Dakota
Quintana Roo
Vermont
Coahuila
California
Baja California
New Hampshire
Baja California Sur
Vermont
Morelos
California
Chihuahua
New Hampshire
Quintana Roo
Vermont
Nuevo Leon
California
Mexico
Rhode Island
Baja California Sur
Vermont
Quintana Roo
California
Oaxaca
Rhode Island
Colima
Vermont
Queretaro
California
Puebla
Rhode Island
Quintana Roo
Vermont
Sinaloa
California
Veracruz
South Dakota
Baja California Sur
Vermont
Sonora
Maine
Baja California Sur South Dakota
Campeche
Vermont
Tabasco
Maine
Colima
South Dakota
Colima
Vermont
Tlaxcala
Maine
Quintana Roo
South Dakota
Quintana Roo
Vermont
Tamaulipas
Montana
Colima
Vermont
Aguascalientes
Vermont
Yucatan
Montana
Campeche
Vermont
Baja California
West Virginia Baja California Sur
Montana
Quintana Roo
Vermont
Baja California Sur
West Virginia Quintana Roo
North Dakota Baja California Sur

104

Figure 2.1. Percentage distribution of matrículas consulares vs. U.S. Census

Figure 2.2. Mexican states average education and migration
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Figure 2.3. Dose response function and treatment effect function,

Notes: 90 percent confidence intervals, represented by dashed lines, are constructed by bootstrapping.

Figure 2.4. Marginal contributions for migrants
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Figure 2.5. Marginal contributions for migrants

Figure A.1. Migration and trade, simple correlation

Notes: Migration is measured as the logarithm plus one of matrículas consulares from 2006-2010, while
trade is measured as the logarithm plus one of trade in 2010; only values greater than zero are included.
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Figure A.2. Dose response function and treatment effect function,

Figure A.3. Dose response function and treatment effect function,
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CHAPTER III
WAGE GAPS, MIGRATION, AND DEVELOPMENT:
A VIEW FROM BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER
Introduction
If a Mexican-born U.S. resident filed a visa application for a sibling living in
Mexico 16 years, 11 months ago, that resident and sibling would just now be receiving a
verdict. If the U.S. resident happened to be born in the Philippines, having filed an
application for a sibling still living in the Philippines, they would be waiting even longer currently up to 23 years and 7 months.47 While these astonishingly long lines at the United
States border are clearly partly driven by U.S. immigration policy restrictions, specifically
yearly quotas limiting the supply of immigrant visas depending on visa class and country
of origin, the lines also exhibit the demand for entry into the United States. In the above
cases, demand is most likely enhanced by the existence of family connections, however the
difference in wages and standards of living across countries is arguably the most important
factor attracting immigrants from all over the world. This demand is reflected by the fact
that 272 potential migrants applied for each visa awarded by the 2010 U.S. Diversity Visa
Lottery for entry at-large, the lottery open to those meeting minimum qualifications and
not applying through family connections to U.S. residents. This number rose to 393 per
available visa in 2012.48

47

These scenarios are based on online priority date information from the U.S. Bureau of Consular Affairs.
As of September 1, 2013, the website lists a priority date for processing of October 8, 1996 for Mexican
siblings, while that of February 15, 1990 for Filipino siblings.

48

The U.S. Bureau of Consular Affairs' website lists detailed statistics for the Diversity Visa Lottery from
2007-2012.

109

International migration demands attention from economists on a number of issues,
many of which have already been examined extensively by the literature. Among a wide
variety of topics, researchers focus on effects of immigration on the destination country
(Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2007); effects of emigration on the origin country
(Taylor and Dyer, 2009); remittances (Stark, 2009); migrant selection (McKenzie et al.,
2010); and most recently, factors underlying individual attitudes toward immigration (Card
et al., 2012). The recognition of the extreme amount of demand for entry in excess of
permitted supply raises the issue of efficiency gains from the relaxation of existing
restrictions on immigration, in addition to the separate need for increased attention to the
effects of migration on the migrants themselves. Only a handful of researchers have started
to tackle these themes, especially crucial to potential migrants outside the OECD countries,
given that studies generally find huge economic gains accruing to those who actually cross
the border into the wealthier countries. For example, Clemens et al. (2008), hereafter CMP,
calculates wage ratios for 42 developing countries of observably equivalent workers
residing in the US compared to residing in the respective country of origin, adjusting for
selection, estimating a median of over 4 for all countries examined. Furthermore, of the
three areas of globalization (goods, capital, and labor), efficiency arguments clearly point
to restrictions on labor mobility as the single largest remaining cause of market distortions
and efficiency losses in the world economy, with goods and capital already enjoying much
higher levels of relatively unrestrained mobility. Pritchett (2006) succinctly signals the
huge disparity in possible worldwide efficiency gains from the three areas of globalization,
comparing a gain of $65 billion from complete capital liberalization (Caselli and Feyrer,
2007), a gain of $107 billion from complete trade liberalization (World Bank, 2005), and

110

the massive gain of $65 trillion from complete labor mobility (Hamilton and Whalley,
1984; Klein and Ventura, 2004). Even a slight relaxation of labor mobility restrictions
would result in huge efficiency gains, estimated at $170 billion given a 3% increase in
migrants in the labor forces of OECD countries (Walmsley and Winters, 2005).
Accepting the potential gains as a given, the issue turns to one of ethics, as limiting
labor mobility is the only remaining widely accepted discrimination based on a
characteristic determined by birth, that of national origin. By sustaining strong restrictions
on labor mobility, wealthy countries are implicitly valuing potentially minuscule losses to
small groups of existing residents more than the huge potential gains to new residents
simply based on country of birth, difficult to justify on any ethical grounds.49 Both
economic efficiency and ethical arguments lead to unequivocal support in favor of more
labor mobility, arguments that become even stronger if viewing human mobility in the light
of its current and potential contributions to economic development. As stated by Clemens
and Pritchett (2008), “...crossing international borders is not an alternative to economic
development, it is economic development.” Indeed, 23 of every 100 Mexicans earning
more than $10/day live abroad; 87 of every 100 Haitians earning more than $10/day live
abroad. Simply put, while migration is much more a complement to rather than a substitute
for more traditionally accepted development strategies, migration indeed makes a large
contribution to the economic development of migrants themselves.
My analysis examines the connection between existing wage gaps, migration, and
migration's power for development, coinciding with CMP in its attempt to bring these

49

The total welfare gain or loss related to immigration remains relatively controversial, with recent
research from di Giovanni et al. (2013) finding that natives in migrant-receiving countries actually
experience long-run gains from increased migration.
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issues to the forefront of the international migration and economic development research
agendas. My empirical analysis relies heavily on two datasets - first, a novel dataset
compiled from personal interviews with migrants in the U.S. as well as households in highmigration communities in Mexico, and second, La Encuesta sobre Migración en la
Frontera Norte de México (EMIF) dataset captures human flows between the United States
and Mexico. By way of the detailed survey information from both EMIF and my original
data, as well as Mexican census data, I allow for a comparison across the differing samples
in attempting to answer the following questions: (1) What are the wage gains for migrants
arriving to and working in the United States? (2) Where in the origin wage distribution do
migrants come from? (3) Where in the origin wage distribution do migrants end up?
In examining the first question, I contribute to the limited number of existing
estimates detailing international wage gaps. Mexican household survey information, along
with the data mentioned above, allows for the calculation of exact wage gains for the
subsample of migrants reporting before- and after-migration wages in both EMIF and the
new data. In answering the second, I focus on the issue of selection, clearly relevant in
thinking about possible future gains from further migration. I again combine the existing
household survey data with the EMIF and new data in pinpointing migrants' starting
positions within the origin wage distributions. Finally, in examining the third, I contribute
evidence to migration's power of development. Specifically, I take the gains to migrants
from question one and place these post-migration wages in the origin wage distribution,
allowing for a dynamic comparison of migrants' before- and after-migration wages relative
to the relevant origin community. Opting to adopt the approach of Clemens and Pritchett
(2008) and focus on people rather than places in terms of development, addressing these
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three questions systematically allows me to obtain succinct measures of migrants'
economic development, in addition to the development relative to those remaining in origin
communities. In particular, the figures for migrants' wage gains from the subsamples make
a much needed contribution; estimates for gains based on comparing outcomes for
observably similar workers are somewhat more common, however gains calculated based
on comparing outcomes for observably and unobservably identical workers - the same
individuals - are few and far between.
I find that the migrant groups under examination enjoy immediate average wage
gains from migration of over $5 (at Purchasing Power Parity) per hour worked, resulting
in average income increases of over fivefold. These absolute wage gains translate into
average relative movements within origin wage distributions of upwards of 50 and 60
percentiles, respectively, for the main two groups studied. Additionally, all but two of the
approximately 40% of migrants in poverty before migration are able to rise above the
poverty line by moving across borders. In continuation, I highlight issues related to the
data, discuss the results, and briefly conclude.
Data and Background
My analysis draws on three datasets: the 2010 Mexican Census, EMIF covering the
years 1999-2009, and the original data collected through household interviews in
communities both in Mexico (HIMEX) and the United States (HIUS). The EMIF data
provides a first look into the actual wage gains accruing to Mexican migrants choosing to
cross the border, as the population working in the U.S. and reentering Mexico in order to
visit can be correctly identified through the survey results. The population that provides an
answer as to wages in the U.S. and the wages earned in Mexico immediately before
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migration form my EMIF sample under examination. It is important to point out that this
sample does not address the wage gains question as exactly as we would like, as migrants
report current wages in the U.S. as opposed to the wages received immediately after
migration to the U.S. during the interview upon reentry into Mexico. Assuming that with
time comes added experience, skills, and possible adaptation to a new labor market that
contributes to higher productivity and results in higher wages, this clearly has the potential
of biasing the apparent wage gains upward, entirely dependent on how much time has
passed between time of migration and the time of the EMIF interview.50
The novel HIMEX and HIUS data address this shortcoming directly, detailing
migrants' wages both immediately before and after migration. Although in some cases the
physical process of migration can be a long one, possibly even several months, it is difficult
to argue that during that time any new experience, skills, or any other factor that would
potentially affect the wage-earning ability of an individual are acquired; this time is spent
just migrating. Therefore, the only change affecting wages is physical geographic location;
a migrant simply leaves one labor market in order to enter another, allowing for complete
identification of the wage gains stemming from migration.
HIMEX and HIUS data are the result of household interviews, conducted both in
Mexico and the U.S. during 2012, following a format similar to that of the Mexican
Migration Project (MMP). HIMEX comprises 264 interviews in the state of Veracruz,
Mexico, a state for which U.S.-destined migration has increased in recent years, while

50

Length of time between migration and the EMIF interview varies across the waves of the EMIF, clearly
increasing in recent years, with the averages as follows: 33 months in 2009, 25 months in 2008, 24 months
in 2007, 19 months in 2006, 18 months in 2005, 17 months in 2004, 16 months in 2003, 13 months in 2002,
13 months in 2001, 11 months in 2000, and 11 months in 1999.
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HIUS is formed by 187 interviews in South Florida. While the HIMEX and HIUS samples
do not necessarily provide data representative of the entire Mexico-U.S. migrant
population, they do contribute two snapshots that are representative at the respective
community level, as households are randomly selected within communities for
participation. Random selection is based on a process of dividing communities into
equally-sized blocks based on satellite map imagery, and the subsequent verification of
mapping of all community blocks in person upon arrival at each specific location.51 The
random selection on both sides of the border provides a key difference between my data
and that of the MMP. The MMP uses the “snowball method” relying on personal references
in U.S. migrant communities; since random selection is used in both Veracruz and South
Florida in my survey, both samples indeed are representative of the communities surveyed.
In addition to absolute wage gains, relative income gains are often argued to be a
potential benefit of importance to migrants. If an individual's income is not only increasing
in absolute terms, but is also growing relative to that of the appropriate reference
population, migration may be even more attractive.52 The Census data allows for the
construction of the origin wage distributions from which the migrant sample migrates.53 In
turn, inserting the HIMEX and HIUS pre- and post-migration wages into the respective

51

HIMEX and HIUS refusal to participate rates reach 12% and 25%, respectively. The number of
observations containing both pre- and post-migration wages included in the calculation of the results
presented in the remainder of the paper are 128 and 69, respectively, due to incomplete answering of the
survey.

52

See Stark and Taylor (1991) for an exposition on the potential importance of these relative differences,
coined relative deprivation.
53
The 2010 Census includes data on wages and various units of time of the wages reported, allowing for a
simple calculation of the hourly wage.
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origin wage distributions permits a clear comparison of the relative position of migrants in
the associated income distributions pre- and post-migration.
For purposes of comparison, all wages are converted to 2011 US dollars at
Purchasing Power Parity (P$) by using World Bank (2012) GDP conversion factors, as
well as the US CPI-U series. Observations containing apparent reporting errors as to wages
are dropped from the EMIF and Census data.54 I use eleven waves of EMIF data, the
average sample size being 6,480. Those migrants reporting wages earned in the U.S. and
wages earned in Mexico immediately before migration average 480 per wave. I extract the
Census data for the nine states and fifteen different Mexican municipios (municipalities)
represented in the HIMEX and HIUS populations, then examining the relative gains at the
municipality level. Approximately one-third of Census observations contain wage
information, examined municipalities ranging from 1,323 to 17,721 in the number of
reported wages.55
Table 3.1 outlines summary statistics from the gathered data on migrants, including
mean, median, standard deviation, and range for each of the two main samples. In
comparing the two samples, on average HIMEX migrants have higher pre- and postmigration wages; furthermore, they are slightly younger at the time of the interview, more
likely to be male, more educated, and less settled in destination communities (by number
of years since migration), relative to HIUS migrants. Additionally, 66% and 80% of
HIMEX and HIUS migrants are married, respectively. HIMEX migrants are more likely to

54

This includes hourly wages less than $0.20 (2011 P$) and clear reporting errors, such as an hourly wage
for manual labor of $450 or $1050.

55

Due to lack of available data, Mexico City, which encompasses various municipalities, is not examined
at the municipality level.
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send remittances than HIUS migrants (21% and 25%, respectively, report sending no
remittances); those HIMEX migrants who do send remittances send more on average than
HIUS migrants, the respective averages representing 18% and 12% of post-migration
wages.56
Results and Discussion
Absolute wage gains
In discussing the results, I use the following straightforward definitions for wage
differences
,

and wage ratios

:

,

,

, where

,

and

are hourly wages for individual adjusted to 2011 P$ immediately post- and pre-

migration, respectively, and

,
,

.

HIMEX
Figure 3.1 summarizes the pre- and post-migration wages for HIMEX emigrants.
On average, a HIMEX emigrant gains P$7.06 in hourly wages by leaving Mexico and
entering the U.S. This gain in wages is immediate, representing the wage gains due purely
to geographic relocation. Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2 signal that this average disguises
considerable variation in gains across the population, with

∈ 3.44, 20.53 , however

all emigrants certainly enjoy positive wage gains from crossing the border. Considering an
alternative measure of wage gains, that of wage ratio

, the average ratio of HIMEX

emigrants is 5.24, meaning that emigrants face earning more than five times in postmigration wages than those earned immediately before migration. Figure 3.3 highlights the

56

This percentage calculation assumes a 40-hour workweek and four weeks of monthly work, as
remittances are reported by migrants on a monthly basis.
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variation across individuals in

, this measure ranging from 1.91 to 13.65. Without a

benchmark for comparison, it is difficult to judge whether these gains are “small” or
“large,” although at first glance the gains to migrants seem quite substantial. However,
simple observation using measures of poverty helps to start put in perspective the
magnitude of gains accruing to migrants willing and wanting to cross the border in the
HIMEX sample. A considerable amount of the HIMEX population is moving out of
poverty, whether using the Mexican or U.S. definition of the poverty line. Immediately
before undertaking migration, 30% of HIMEX migrants are below the Mexican poverty
line of $1904 (unadjusted, per individual) pesos per month established by the Consejo
Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL).57 Immediately
after migration, with an average wage of P$8.92 per hour, zero HIMEX migrants are in
poverty measured by the 2012 U.S. standard of $11,170 (unadjusted, per individual)
annually; the entire portion of impoverished individuals not only springboards out of
poverty by the Mexican measure, poverty is no longer found in this population even when
measured by the more stringent U.S. poverty line.
HIUS
Figure 3.4 shows hourly wages for the HIUS migrants pre- and post-migration. By
visual inspection, the distributions are quite similar to those of the HIMEX sample; Table
3.2 highlights that HIUS migrants have a slightly lower pre- and post-migration hourly
wage than their HIMEX counterparts, averaging P$1.75 and P$6.96, respectively. Average
absolute wage gains of P$5.22 accrue to HIUS migrants, coming up short of those of

57

For ease of exposition, I use the most recent poverty line pobreza patrimonial from 2008, although the
CONEVAL has also adopted a multidimensional strategy for measuring poverty in Mexico based on
factors other than just income.
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HIMEX migrants. However, the distribution of those gains exhibits more homogeneity for
HIUS migrants than for HIMEX migrants, with

∈ 1.77, 8.80 as evidenced in Figure

3.5.
As displayed in Figure 3.6, HIUS migrants enjoy an average wage ratio of 5.56,
nearly mirroring the HIMEX average wage ratio; even the migrant gaining the least in
magnitude still enjoys considerable wage gains, enjoying a wage ratio of 1.41. Again
framing the evidence in terms of the Mexican and U.S. poverty lines, 63% of HIUS
migrants live in poverty pre-migration, earning less than $1904 pesos per month.
Astoundingly, the act of migrating moves all but two migrants above the U.S. poverty line
of $11,170 annual dollars in post-migration wages, while zero are left in poverty by the
Mexican measure.
EMIF
Although the variation in time elapsed between each individual's migration and the
corresponding EMIF survey is problematic for identifying the wage gains due solely to
geographic mobility, the data provides a benchmark for comparing the gains found in the
HIMEX and HIUS samples, especially useful since the EMIF provides a representative
sample of Mexican border crossers.58 Figure 3.7 depicts the absolute wage gains accruing
to EMIF-surveyed migrants, showing the distribution of pre-migration versus postmigration hourly wages. For both wage distributions and the resulting wage ratios
displayed in Figure 3.8, results are extremely consistent across the eleven EMIF waves
examined, with only the slight amount of variation noted by comparing averages (medians)

58

See Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (2012) for details on methodology of the EMIF.
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from Table 3.2. The full EMIF samples exhibit a wage difference range (in averages) from
a minimum of P$6.20 (2003) to a maximum of P$7.68 (2009); wage ratio averages lie
between 4.65 (2003) and 5.29 (1999 and 2009). While HIUS average wage differences fall
short of those of the EMIF samples due to overall lower wages (both before and after
migration), both HIMEX and HIUS wage ratios reside near the upper limit of the EMIF
samples, HIUS average wage ratios eclipsing all EMIF averages at 5.56.
In the interest of further detailing the true amount of wage gains attributable solely
to migration, I trim the EMIF samples by analyzing wage changes for only those migrants
who report fewer than twelve months elapsed between migration and the EMIF interview.
With this limited window of time, it is reasonable to assume that the U.S. wages reported
in the EMIF interview are equal to the wages received immediately after migration. Given
the expectation that both wage ratios and wage differences are biased upward as longer
time periods elapse between migration and the EMIF survey, the revised samples should
return both attenuated wage differences and wage ratios compared to those of the full EMIF
samples. Table 3.2 confirms the hypothesized effect, as both wage differences and wage
ratios drop across all EMIF waves for the subsample reporting less than twelve months
elapsed. However, perhaps somewhat surprisingly the decreases are not large in magnitude,
leaving two possible explanations. First, migrant workers may not be enjoying as much
wage growth as expected after arrival in the U.S., most wage gains actually accruing
immediately upon arrival due exclusively to migration. Second, differences in time elapsed
between the trimmed sample of less than twelve months and the rest of the sample may not
be large enough to permit wage growth over time to take on any magnitude of significance
in the present analysis. Average wage differences ranging from P$5.87 (2003) to P$7.14
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(2009) approach those of HIMEX and HIUS migrants, while HIMEX and HIUS average
wage ratios lie just above the trimmed samples' range of 3.92 (2008) to 5.22 (1999).
In further examining these results, I again rely on CMP and Pritchett (2006) in
making comparisons with various wage ratios discussed in the literature. CMP provides a
convenient benchmark estimate for comparison with

, however it is important to note

that this estimate is generated from much different data and observably equivalent workers,
adjusted for selection, while my figures are calculated comparing observably and
unobservably equivalent workers; the CMP measure of

(comparable to

) for Mexico

is estimated as 2.46, after adjustment for selection. Pritchett (2006) highlights other types
of wage discrimination dependent on aspects such as race or gender; for example, the 1995
male-female wage ratio in the US is estimated as 1.3 and in the median country as 1.4,
while the 1939 US white-black wage ratio has been estimated at 1.6. While these wage
ratios pale in comparison to both the

of CMP and even the lowest of my calculated wage

ratios, ironically they receive much more attention than the wage ratios mentioned in this
paper. With no formal restrictions on worker mobility, one might imagine a
approaching the geographic ratios also mentioned in Pritchett (2006) of the 1999 urbanrural wage ratio of 1.4 averaged over 43 countries, or the 1999 US-Puerto Rico wage ratio
of 1.5.59

Relative wage gains

59

Even with no restrictions on worker mobility, it is reasonable to expect the sustainability of wage ratios
greater than 1, as the costs of moving, including potential differences in language, customs, culture, etc.
make relocating less attractive relative to the origin.
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Examining relative wage gains provides a second perspective on the economic
benefits migrants enjoy by moving across the border. The widely-studied idea of relative
deprivation highlighted in Stark and Taylor (1991) forms the theoretical foundation for my
strategy of placing the migrant pre- and post-migration wages into the wage distribution of
the origin communities, specifically at the municipality level. This allows for a
straightforward inspection of where in the distribution migrants come from, and where in
the distribution migrants end up. The selection of the origin community as the relevant
reference group is simple to justify as the majority of migrants in the HIMEX and HIUS
samples maintain strong connections with family members in Mexico, migrants often
crossing the border without their immediate families. Anecdotal evidence confirms this
idea as well, as several interviewees in Mexico explained, “If you want to talk to the
migrant families, just look for the nicer houses.” Some of these houses are the result of
individual male migrants sending money to their respective wives who have stayed behind
in Mexico, while some are the result of accumulated savings for a migrant who decided to
make the move back to Mexico after some time in the U.S. - in either case, the evidence
indeed points to the origin community as the appropriate group of reference. While
reference groups may be subject to partial or complete revision if a migrant becomes more
(less) connected to the destination (origin) community, I assume this possibility away,
especially given that the measured wage gains accrue immediately upon migration, when
migrants are arguably just as connected to origin communities as before undertaking
migration.60

60

I relax this assumption in the following subsection, examining the possibility of revised groups of
reference.
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HIMEX
Figure 9 clearly shows the movement in the origin wage distribution that HIMEX
migrants make. Pre-migration wages are concentrated in the lower half of the Census wage
distribution, with the dashed-line bars representing these wages before relocation. Postmigration wages move to the right tail of the distribution, dotted bars representing these
relatively high wages after relocation. Figure 3.10 paints an even clearer picture of the
relative movement, as it displays the percentiles of the origin wage distribution from which
migrants come and the percentiles in which they end up immediately after migrating.
HIMEX migrants are fairly evenly spread out among the Census distribution before
migration, although the majority clearly comes from below the median wage. However,
the dotted bars represent the dramatic post-migration change; all migrants move to the
upper two deciles of the origin wage distribution simply by migrating. Migrant premigration wages are spread between the 3rd and 92nd percentiles of the Census wage
distribution, the average coming from the 38th and the median from the 40th; postmigration wages all fall in the upper section of Census wages between the 84th and 99th
percentiles, the average falling in the 90th and the median in the 91st. As a result, the
average HIMEX migrant leapfrogs over 52 percent of the reference population by
undertaking migration.

HIUS
HIUS migrants come from an assortment of origin wage distributions, spread across
14 municipalities in 8 different Mexican states. Figure 3.11 summarizes the relative gains
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for all HIUS migrants across all represented municipalities, although migrants are placed
in the respective origin wage distributions separately in order to arrive at the displayed
percentiles. HIUS migrants come disproportionately from the lower deciles of the various
Census wage distributions, starting from relatively disadvantaged income positions even
more than HIMEX migrants. However, movements within the origin wage distributions
are quite similar to those of the HIMEX counterparts; HIUS migrants move to the upper
deciles of the Census wage distributions, with slightly greater variation in percentile
outcomes than HIMEX migrants. HIUS migrant pre-migration wages are spread between
the 1st and 84th percentiles of the respective Census wage distributions, the average
coming from the 15th and the median from the 9th; post-migration wages fall between the
52nd and 94th percentiles of Census wages, the average falling in the 79th and the median
in the 80th. These dramatic changes result in the average HIUS migrant jumping over 64
percent of the population within the origin wage distribution upon migrating.
Are migrants better off after migration?
Clearly migrants are benefiting from large wage gains; however, income gains do
not necessarily translate into a higher level of overall well-being. Costs of migration, both
financial and any costs related to a preference for places of origin, cut into the income gains
that migrants enjoy, but migrants may also change the relevant group of reference upon
migrating or over time as adaptation to the place of destination occurs, this possibility
examined recently in Stillman et al. (2012). If the reference group changes, even a higher
level of objective well-being (income gains net of any migration costs) could result in a
lower level of subjective well-being if migrants now compare their respective situations to
the incomes of the destination community that are generally higher than those of the
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community of origin. While revealed preference suggests that migrants are better off after
migration, Bartram (2011) argues that migration results in seemingly paradoxical lower
levels of well-being. However, Stillman et al. (2012) challenges this conclusion,
emphasizing clear higher levels of objective well-being yet complex and conflicting results
regarding subjective well-being.
Unfortunately, given the nature of the potential costs of migration, measuring the
wage gains to migration is an easier task than measuring the costs. It is nearly impossible
to quantify any cost related to differences in language and culture or a preference for place
of origin; however, my survey data provides a glimpse as to the large portion of the
migration cost related to the actual trip. The actual cost of the migration trip itself averages
P$2249 for HIMEX migrants and P$2570 for HIUS migrants.61 This cost includes and is
often dominated by the frequent cost of the hired coyote, responsible for facilitating the
border crossing of undocumented migrants.62 This up-front cost to migration is certainly
large, often requiring borrowing to finance the expense, especially given the origin income
levels of the migrants entering the samples. The substantial average costs are equivalent to
between 9 and 11 months income for an individual hovering at the Mexican poverty line
of $1904 pesos per month. However, Table 3.3 provides a contrasting perspective, arguably
signaling that this cost is not as large as first appears. Given cost of migration
difference

and wage

, I calculate the number of hours of work required for each individual

migrant to “break even,”

.

61

In all reported statistics related to cost and the subsequent break-even hours, I do not include
observations for migrants reporting a total cost of $0.

62

While interviewees are not explicitly asked about legal status or the use of coyotes, many volunteer
information, detailing both the cost of the coyote as well as the total cost of migration.
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Assuming a 40-hour workweek, the average HIMEX migrant breaks even near the
beginning of the ninth week of work, while the average HIUS migrant must wait until the
thirteenth week. In turn, objective well-being is clearly increased through migration, unless
those uncaptured recurring costs of migration related to preference for place of origin
surpass the remaining wage gains during the first year of migration and also year after year
if the migrant prolongs residence in the destination community. While impossible to rule
out given lack of data on the other costs of migration, the possibility of a net loss does not
appear to be a likely occurrence, as this would require those other costs of migration to
average a minimum of P$8737 and P$5576 for HIMEX and HIUS migrants per year,
respectively, given the average break-even hours and wage gains for each group.63
With apparent gains in objective well-being in hand, the last question of my
household survey allows for the examination of the subjective well-being of migrants, as
well as insight on the relative importance of absolute versus relative gains. “Knowing what
you do today, would you choose to migrate if you had the decision to make again?” was
asked of every survey participant as a wrap-up question to the interview.64 In turn,
examining the various possible outcomes related to this question, partially dependent on
whether migrants update the reference group to the destination community or hold on to

63
This requirement is conservatively calculated with the first year of migration in mind, when costs are
highest due to the cost of the actual trip, ; I assume a 40-hour workweek and 40 weeks of work per year,
allowing for periods of unemployment. Given the averages of break-even hours, this means that HIMEX
and HIUS migrants have 1237.6 and 1068.32 hours, respectively, left over to cover any uncaptured costs of
migration before experiencing zero net gains.
64
While reporting responses beyond the yes/no answers is outside the scope of this paper, this question
resulted in much of the most interesting information that the interviewees shared with me, as many
migrants expressed strong mixed feelings on migration related to (dis)advantages of the communities of
origin and destination.
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the community of origin, allows for inference on the subjective well-being of migrants and
further exploration of absolute versus relative gains from migration.65
Given that all migrants in the HIMEX and HIUS samples experience both absolute
and relative gains (relative to the origin community), if “no” is the chosen answer, only
two options exist: (1) the costs of migration are so great that they outweigh the absolute
and relative wage gains, or (2) the migrant is indeed updating the reference group and
suffering a worse relative standing within the relevant community overshadows the large
absolute gains from migration. If the answer is “yes,” one of three explanations must hold
for each migrant: (1) updating of the reference group occurs and relative position worsens,
however the absolute gains are large enough to outweigh the relative losses, (2) updating
of the reference group occurs and relative position improves, adding extra benefit to the
absolute gains, or (3) no updating of the reference group occurs, leaving the absolute gains
and improved position relative to the origin community.
Exploring the evidence further, even though every single migrant sampled
experiences post-migration absolute wage gains and improved position relative to the
origin community, migrants are generally worse off post-migration relative to the US
destination community than in the Mexican origin community pre-migration. Using the
corresponding Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMA) from 2011 American Community
Survey data as the relevant US destination community, the average HIUS migrant falls 8
percentiles in the wage distribution to the 7th percentile. This average disguises a
considerable range of outcomes, spread from gains of 11 percentiles to losses of 72

65

It is clearly possible that migrants may have hybrid reference groups, some mixture of both destination
and origin communities, however I assume away this possibility in the following discussion for ease of
exposition.
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percentiles, associated with relative positions ranging from the 1st percentile to the 39th in
the US PUMA wage distribution. With 86% of HIUS answers and 91% of HIMEX answers
“yes,” option (2) can be eliminated as a general explanation; either absolute gains outweigh
the relative losses (if reference groups are updated) or migrants overwhelmingly are not
updating reference groups. However, it should be pointed out that even though worse
relative position in the destination community does not appear to be a deciding factor, a
larger fall in relative position may contribute to “no” answers, as a t-test for differences in
changes in relative positioning is statistically significant at the 5% level when comparing
the “yes” and “no” responders. Although both groups lose in relative position on average,
the “no” responders fall an average of nearly 17 percentiles more than “yes” responders.66
Further insight is provided by examining how the answers relate to the size of wage
gains and length of time since the migration occurred. Intuitively, one clearly expects
subjective well-being (the probability of a “yes” answer) to be increasing in the size of
absolute and/or relative wage gains. As far as the length of time, it is not clear whether a
longer time at destination would translate into a higher or lower probability of higher
subjective well-being; as migrants spend more time in the destination community, it is
more likely that they update the reference group to the destination, giving a higher group
of incomes with which to compare relative position, however the very fact that more time
has been spent since migration could reflect a type of selection in the sense that only the
most satisfied migrants remain in the destination community for longer periods of time.

66

These ideas provide avenues for future research, however further data is clearly required in order to reach
definitive conclusions.
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Looking to the data, Table 3.4 summarizes a comparison of the three main measures
of wage gains (without costs) between the migrants answering “yes” and those answering
“no” in each sample. I report the difference in means (the means of “no” responders
subtracted from the means of “yes” responders) and the standard deviation of wage
differences, wage ratios, and percentile changes within the origin wage distributions, as
well as the t-statistics, checking to verify if the two groups exhibit statistically significant
differences in wage gains. While HIUS migrants certainly provide evidence in favor of the
hypothesized positive association between wage gains and subjective well-being, with
statistically significant positive differences in means at the 5% level for both wage
differences and percentile changes, HIMEX does not signal the same. Differences in
means, while not statistically significant, are actually negative for all three measures, with
the unexpected result that migrants answering “no” experience more wage gains on average
than the rest of the sample. On the other hand, the very reason for separating the HIMEX
and HIUS samples in reporting results, the difference in geographic location of the
interviews, may suggest a reason for the HIMEX negative differences in means. The
HIMEX sample includes return migrants, who may have achieved relative success through
migration and already reached a target goal allowing them to return to the place of origin.
If this is indeed the case, some may be unduly influenced by this fact in answering the
question as to subjective well-being, given that the return decision was previously made,
thereby leading to “no” responders being among the most successful as far as gains from
migration.
Switching to net gains, the last row of each section in Table 3.4 reports the same statistics
as those above, however using break-even hours
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as the relevant measure of gains from

migration. Similar to the wage gains (without costs) story, the HIUS sample supports the
hypothesized relationship, showing that “yes” responders have a highly statistically
significant lower amount of break-even hours, however the HIMEX sample shows no
statistically significant differences, the difference in means being positive (“no” responders
have fewer break-even hours than “yes” responders). Table 3.5 displays a similar
comparison between the two groups for the length of time in the destination community
(length of time since migration). As expected, these results are even more inconclusive,
with neither sample providing statistically significant differences between “yes” and “no”
responders.
Comparing with an established program of successful development
If we indeed accept migration as not an alternative to economic development, but
rather a crucial component of development, it is inevitable to ask how the net gains from
migration compare with those of other programs of economic development. In the context
of Mexico, a program that has been deemed as one of the most successful is that of
PROGRESA/Oportunidades. With no fewer than 30 countries now adopting and including
conditional cash transfer programs such as PROGRESA/Oportunidades as part of social
policy, it is no surprise to find a return of over 50 papers from a simple title search on
“Progresa” at the online economics database at ideas.repec.org. Behrman et al. (2011)
provides a follow-up to previous work analyzing the success of the program in Mexico,
estimating the “long-run” costs and benefits to the program based on the return in terms of
increased schooling due to program participation, as well as various assumed rates of return
to schooling and discount rates. Given the lowest assumed discount rate of 3%, along with
the highest assumed return to schooling at 10%, a 9-10 year-old boy starting six years of
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PROGRESA/Oportunidades participation can expect $3557 in extra lifetime earnings due
to the improved human capital.
While this amount certainly reflects successful outcomes for participants in
PROGRESA/Oportunidades, how does it compare to the gains from migration? Even by
stacking the deck against migration and employing the highest average break-even hours,
531.68 of the HIUS sample, an astounding result obtains. Converting to P$, $3557 becomes
P$5487, meaning that a Mexican migrant would have to work just over 1000 hours in the
United States to match a lifetime of extra earnings from six years of participation in
PROGRESA/Oportunidades. Adding this to the work required to recuperate the explicit
cost of migration, and assuming a 40-hour workweek, 39 weeks of work in the US
surpasses the lifetime net benefits of one of the most successful development programs on
record.67

While

I

do

not

want

to

suggest

a

lack

of

importance

of

PROGRESA/Oportunidades or any other development program already in place, this stark
comparison clearly emphasizes just how powerful a development tool migration has been
and could potentially be in the future.
Observable characteristics and (net) gains
As a final examination of the survey data, I characterize the relationship between
relevant observable traits of the migrant samples and the associated (net) gains of
migration. In doing this, I focus on education, gender, time since migration, age at
migration, and legal migration status, respectively, and the connection with my various

67

I assume that PROGRESA/Oportunidades entails no cost to the individual participant, intentionally
ignoring societal costs in making this comparison. While PROGRESA/Oportunidades clearly has a cost of
implementation, it is not clear whether further labor mobility would result in increased or decreased costs to
society, due to the many effects on both origin and destination countries of migration. A full analysis of this
question is beyond the scope of this paper, however provides a clear avenue for further research.
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measures of (net) gains, i.e.

,

, and

. Further understanding of these relationships

is important in attempting to identify if certain types of migrants are relatively more or less
likely to enjoy larger gains from migration. While the literature tends to signal potential
gains increasing in education, hypothesizing a relationship between education and gains is
not straightforward across the varied measures. While it may be reasonable to expect this
positive relationship to hold when using
imagine the opposite result if using

as the measure of gains, it is also easy to
, given the fact that individuals with lower

education levels tend to have a lower initial wage before migration. Concerning the other
observable traits of focus, I refrain from hypothesizing the correlations given similar
confounding issues, however emphasize time since migration given a potential concern. In
reporting the results of both HIMEX and HIUS samples, I group together individual
migrants who have migrated over a considerable span of years. Even though all gains are
reported using only wage immediately pre- and post-migration, if gains to migration are
consistently increasing (decreasing) over time, it may be more reasonable for purposes of
comparison to separate the samples further into subdivisions according to year of
migration.
Table 3.6 details the simple correlations between the selected observable
characteristics and the three varied measures of (net) gains for the HIUS sample. Without
controlling for other potential determinants of gains, gains from migration are negatively
associated with years of education, positively associated with years since migration, and
positively associated with cost of migration, the proxy for legal status given the assumption
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that migration without legal documents results in an increased

.68 The relationship with

age at migration is unclear, older age negatively associated with the wage difference, while
pointing to larger gains using the wage ratio and break-even hours. A t-test separating men
and women results in no statistically significant differences across all three measures of
gains, men generally enjoying marginally larger gains relative to women. In addition to ,
I employ voluntarily-reported results on the payment to a coyote as an alternative proxy
for legal status. This is not an exact measure of legal status because no explicit question as
to legal status was included in the household survey, however many interviewees
voluntarily offered information on the use of a coyote in answering the question on cost of
migration. Furthermore, it is also possible that some migrants who cross the border illegally
do not employ a coyote. Dividing the sample into those reporting the use of a coyote
(irrespective of reported cost) and those who do not, a maximum t-statistic of 0.94 for ttest on the three measures of gains signals a lack of statistically significant differences
between the two groups.
The OLS regression results detailed in Table 3.7 provide an alternative perspective
as to the relationship between the selected observable characteristics of migrants and their
gains from migration. General positive (negative) associations reflect the correlations
detailed in Table 3.6, however the estimates are plagued by a lack of statistical significance,
only years since migration and education being statistically significant at the 10% level for
and

, respectively. In summary, while being less educated, being male, and having

migrated a longer time ago appear to be associated with larger gains from migration, the

68

The positive association with cost of migration is expected, as this association does not include net gains.
This can be translated as higher wage gains needed to compensate the migrant for a higher migration cost.
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evidence on specific determinants of these gains is rather inconclusive for the HIUS
sample; nearly all estimates reflect statistical insignificance.
Conclusion
In answering the three central questions stated in the opening section of this paper,
the results tell an overwhelmingly straightforward story. With minimum average wage
ratios of 3.92 across all examined samples, migrants are experiencing large wage gains by
crossing the Mexico-U.S. border. HIMEX and HIUS migrants gain an average of P$7.06
and P$5.22 per hour worked, and enjoy average wage ratios of 5.24 and 5.56, respectively.
Even given the explicit cost of migration that cuts into these wage gains, HIMEX and HIUS
migrants need only an average of 362 and 521 hours of work in the U.S., respectively,
before experiencing outright positive gains. 100% of the approximately 30% of HIMEX
migrants starting below the Mexican poverty line make the jump out of poverty by
relocating, even when measured by the more stringent U.S. measure of the poverty line;
only 2 of the 60% of HIUS migrants moving away from poverty in Mexico remain
impoverished by U.S. standards. It is indeed difficult or nearly impossible to find evidence
of (or even imagine) a specific program of economic development with a success rate
similar to that of migration found in this paper; what program can claim such success
stories as pulling all impoverished individuals out of poverty (HIMEX) or increasing
participants' incomes more than fivefold on average (HIMEX and HIUS)?
In addition to the absolute wage gains, migration also translates into large
movements in migrants' relative positions within the origin wage distributions. Before
migrating, the average HIMEX migrant resides at the 38th percentile of the origin wage
distribution, moving to the 84th percentile immediately after migration; the average HIUS
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migrant moves from the 15th to the 79th percentile. Upon migration, HIMEX migrants on
average pass 52% of the population in the respective origin wage distribution, while HIUS
migrants advance past an astounding average of 64% of the relevant reference population.
Furthermore, while 70% of HIMEX migrants and 91% of HIUS migrants have premigration wages below the corresponding median income, 100% and 34% rise to the very
top of the origin wage distributions, jumping to the highest two deciles immediately after
migration.
With these impressively large documented gains available to migrants willing and
wanting to move across the border, especially as governments either seek to further limit
international migration or discuss options for alternative immigration schemes around the
world, further examination of the effects of these policies and complete understanding of
the motivation for and determinants of migration is essential. In focusing on the economic
development consequences of migration, the effect of migration on migrants themselves perhaps the most important effect of all - must not be forgotten and pushed behind other
themes such as effects on sending or receiving countries in the international migration and
economic development research. Letouzé et al. (2009) states “...that migration is not an
important contributor nor hindrance to development...best seen in terms of the expanded
opportunities it offers individuals to carry out their life plans.” However, viewed through
the lens of the shifted focus of development on people rather than places, migration not
only expands opportunities, those very expanded opportunities contribute greatly to what
the definition of economic development should be all about.
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics of migrant samples
Indicator
Mean
Median
Std. dev.
HIMEX (
128)
Pre-migration wage (P$/hr.) 1.87
1.79
0.69
Post-migration wage (P$/hr.) 8.93
7.83
3.12
Age at interview
38.02
37
10.23
Gender (m 1, f 2)
1.28
1
0.45
Years of schooling
8.80
8
2.75
Years since migration
11.89
12
6.61
Remittances (monthly P$)
181.25
200
171.95
HIUS (
69)
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Min./max.
0.84/5.77
5.92/24.23
21/75
1/2
3/16
1/44
0/1000

Pre-migration wage (P$/hr.)
Post-migration wage (P$/hr.)
Age at interview
Gender (m 1, f 2)
Years of schooling
Years since migration
Remittances (monthly P$)

1.75
6.96
40.44
1.48
6.65
16.77
102.20

1.49
6.73
39
1
6
14
100
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1.25
1.37
13.55
0.50
3.67
9.31
82.83

0.25/8.57
4.14/14.04
18/76
1/2
0/14
1/45
0/300

HIMEX
HIUS
EMIF
2009 full
12 months
2008 full
12 months
2007 full
12 months
2006 full
12 months
2005 full
12 months
2004 full
12 months
2003 full
12 months
2002 full
12 months
2001 full
12 months
2000 full
12 months
1999 full
12 months

Pre-migration wage
Average Median
1.87
1.79
1.75
1.49

Table 3.2. Migrant wage gains
Post-migration wage
Wage difference
Wage ratio
Average
Median
Average Median Std. dev Average Median Std. dev.
8.93
7.83
7.06
5.87
1.21
5.24
4.50
4.01
6.96
6.95
5.22
5.15
3.03
5.56
4.29
2.36

2.44
2.55
2.99
3.63
2.91
3.55
3.09
3.30
2.92
3.06
2.76
2.78
2.90
3.04
2.81
2.98
2.67
2.66
2.42
2.48
2.56
2.50

10.12
9.69
10.62
10.05
10.34
10.36
10.06
10.06
10.03
10.08
9.68
9.39
9.10
8.91
9.16
8.86
9.18
9.01
8.81
8.66
9.13
8.97

2.12
2.11
2.32
2.61
2.20
2.44
2.23
2.27
2.35
2.39
2.07
2.07
2.24
2.32
2.12
2.12
1.98
2.01
1.79
1.79
1.80
1.80

9.36
8.67
9.36
9.10
9.00
8.64
8.96
8.96
9.20
8.63
8.93
8.33
8.54
8.24
8.75
8.52
7.94
7.83
7.86
7.86
8.10
8.10

7.68
7.14
7.62
6.42
7.43
6.82
6.97
6.76
7.10
7.01
6.92
6.61
6.20
5.87
6.35
5.89
6.51
6.36
6.39
6.19
6.57
6.47
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7.12
6.73
6.92
6.58
6.56
6.25
6.45
5.95
6.44
6.33
6.26
6.08
6.00
5.69
6.17
5.91
6.18
5.94
6.17
6.12
6.07
6.00

4.08
4.16
5.40
3.94
5.26
4.78
5.22
6.26
5.07
5.29
4.55
4.82
4.38
4.12
4.28
4.11
4.77
4.81
3.71
3.50
5.06
4.83

5.29
4.69
4.73
3.92
4.87
4.21
4.75
4.56
4.84
4.55
4.83
4.54
4.65
4.22
4.85
4.56
5.14
4.73
5.27
5.00
5.29
5.22

4.68
4.10
3.99
3.59
4.13
3.69
4.03
3.74
3.85
3.74
4.05
3.74
3.92
3.64
3.93
3.93
4.54
4.21
4.65
4.50
4.50
4.43

3.13
2.68
3.12
2.12
3.47
2.55
3.70
3.91
3.57
3.52
3.15
2.94
3.42
3.23
3.57
3.34
3.67
3.11
3.30
3.05
3.52
3.53

Table 3.3. Break-even hours
Mean
Std. dev.
Median

Min./max.

HIMEX
Break-even hours

362.40

194.43

341.11

36.50/1104.62

HIUS
Break-even hours

531.68

325.58

455.44

39.50/2017.49

Table 3.4. Wage gains and subjective well-being
Mean
Std. dev.
T-stat
HIMEX
Wage difference
Wage ratio
Percentile change (origin)
Break-even hours
HIUS
Wage difference
Wage ratio
Percentile change (origin)
Break-even hours

-0.71
-1.37
-10.11
81.89

1.01
0.77
6.76
64.99

-0.71
-1.77
-1.49
1.26

1.09
1.92
17.82
-354.40

0.42
1.44
6.32
125.66

2.60
1.34
2.82
-2.82

Notes: Mean reports the difference in means between the respective values of “yes” responders minus those
of “no” responders, while std. dev. is the associated standard deviation. T-stat signals the statistical
significance of the differences across the two groups, an absolute value greater than 1.96 being statistically
significant at the 5% level.

Table 3.5. Length of time since migration and subjective well-being
Mean
Std. dev.
T-stat
HIMEX
Length of time since migration
HIUS
Length of time since migration

-0.74

2.17

-0.34

0.98

3.37

0.29

Notes: Mean reports the difference in means between the respective values of “yes” responders minus those
of “no” responders, while std. dev. is the associated standard deviation. T-stat signals the statistical
significance of the differences across the two groups, an absolute value greater than 1.96 being statistically
significant at the 5% level.

139

Table 3.6. Simple correlations: observable characteristics and gains from migration
Years of education Years since migration Age at migration
-0.16
0.47
-0.02
0.18
-0.39
0.07
0.22
0.12
0.06
-0.24
-0.01
---

Table 3.7. OLS regression results
Dependent variable:
Covariates
Coefficient
Education
-0.03
Gender
-0.21
Years since migration 0.05***
Age at migration
-0.00
Cost
0.00
Constant
4.78***
0.27

Std. error
0.05
0.28
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.90
---

Coefficient
-0.47**
0.32
-0.00
0.01
0.00
6.93*
0.17

Std. error
0.20
1.12
0.06
0.07
0.00
3.66
---

Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Coefficient
-0.37
12.50
-8.88
-0.96
--631.95**
0.06

Std. error
16.76
94.75
5.31
5.97
--296.35
---

Figure 3.1. HIMEX wages before and after migration

Figure 3.2. HIMEX wage gains from migration
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Figure 3.3. HIMEX wage ratios

Figure 3.4. HIUS wages before and after migration
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Figure 3.5. HIUS wage gains from migration

Figure 3.6. HIUS wage ratios
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Figure 3.7. EMIF wages

Figure 3.8. EMIF wage ratios

144

Figure 3.9. HIMEX wages

Figure 3.10. HIMEX in Census distribution
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Figure 3.11. HIUS in Census distribution
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